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Abstract  
 
This paper aims to investigate the change in corporate debt levels in South Africa 
from 1994 to 2016, included is an analysis of factors that firms take into consideration 
when determining the company’s capital structure. 
This study uses data from firms in the Real Estate and REIT, Travel and Leisure and 
Construction and Materials sectors listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). Four different leverage measures are used to determine the change in capital 
structure for the period under review, as well as six of the most commonly used 
determinants of capital structure. 
A high level interpretation of the results reflected the following; an increase in the use 
of debt in the Travel and Leisure and Construction and Materials Sectors, however a 
significant decrease in the use of debt relative to equity was seen in the Real Estate 
and REIT Sector thus skewing the Total Sample findings considerably. An increase in 
the use of long term debt relative to short term was also found.  
Results from the analysis of the capital structure determinants varied, with some 
determinants showing statistical significance. The following determinants were 
positively related to debt; firm size, asset tangibility and growth while the 
determinants; cost of debt and tax had a negative relationship. The relationship 
between profitability and leverage was varied. 
 
 
Keywords:  
Capital Structure Theory, Capital Structure Determinants, Interest Rates, Capital 
Market, Real Estate, Real Estate Investment Trusts, Travel and Leisure, Construction 
and Materials 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The capital structure decision has been one of the most fundamental decisions for 
corporates in South Africa following its newly established Democracy in 1994.  
Moving into the new democracy, macro-economic objectives were set to achieve 
sustainable economic growth using tools such, as fiscal and monetary policy. These 
policies have had considerable impact on the capital structure decision of companies 
in South Africa and, consequently, a role in determining the financial stability and 
going concern of companies. 
A look at the South African economy for the period of 1994 to 2016 is crucial as this 
period coincides with South Africa’s new Democracy. Prior to the political transition, in 
1994, South Africa’s economy was characterised with indicators of poor economic 
growth, current account balance surpluses, high inflation and low foreign exchange 
reserves. This was caused by South Africa’s isolation from the world market due to 
sanctions imposed by the international community, this resulted in an outflow of 
capital (Faulkner& Loewald, 2008).  Therefore, recognising the impact of the macro-
economic environment in determining the capital structure decision of firms is central 
to this study. 
Firms within the real estate and real estate investment trusts (REITs), travel and 
leisure and construction and materials sectors of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) will be analysed. While these firms only contributed toward 5% of the total 
market capitalisation of the JSE at the end of 2016, they accounted for 20% of the 
total number of listed firms. Furthermore, firms within the real estate and REIT sectors 
account for three of the eight specialised indices listed on the JSE. The data set 
includes a total of 76 firms and 792 observations, of which 47 firms are within the real 
estate and REIT sector, totalling 90% of the sample’s market capitalisation at 2016. 
(JSE, 2016) 
A study regarding capital structure and its determinants, performed by Harrison, 
Panasian and Seiler (2011) examined the determinants of capital structure decisions 
of REITs in the US between 1990 and 2008. The paper discusses different capital 
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structure theories that may impact a firm’s capital structure decisions. The paper, 
however, highlights a considerable difference between the REIT sector and other 
sectors within the economy, namely; REITs have the statutory ability to avoid 
payments of corporate income tax should they distribute a minimum of 90% of their 
profits. This is similar to the South African context in which the REIT regime affords 
certain tax advantages to qualifying entities, and exempts SA REITs from capital 
gains tax (CGT). These are therefore of considerable interest, and thus included in 
this study. In addition, REITs have significant fixed assets, as a result of their 
business models. (SARS, 2013) 
Similarly, the travel and leisure and construction and materials sectors of the JSE are 
fixed asset intensive, through the use of property and machinery, respectively. These, 
including the real estate and REIT sectors, form the basis of this research paper. 
This paper will form part of a research project in which each of the remaining sectors 
of the JSE, including delisted stocks, will be investigated by different authors. Each of 
the studies will investigate the change in corporate debt levels in South Africa from 
1994 to 2016, including an analysis of factors that firms take into consideration when 
determining the company’s capital structure. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
An analysis of South Africa’s changes in corporate leverage is important given 
conflicting perceptions of debt financing within the South African economy especially 
within these crucial sectors; real estate and REITs, travel and leisure and construction 
and materials of the JSE. 
Furthermore, the South African environment has changed considerably across the 
period under review. South African capital markets have been subject to numerous 
exogenous shocks, for example the East Asian Crisis of 1997 and 1998, the Global 
Financial Crisis resulting from the sub-prime bust in the Unites States, the financial 
crisis of the Eurozone, BREXIT and, closer to home, apartheid and the associated 
sanctions of the 1980s and early 1990s. These notable events presented South 
African policy makers with the challenging task of maintaining stability in the 
economy, including stabilising inflation rates within the tolerated band. Policy makers 
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manipulated the repurchase rate, or money supply, using monetary and fiscal policy 
in order to achieve the desired results in the economy. No action by policymakers, 
would allow market forces to come into effect and bring the economy into an 
equilibrium. As a result, the repurchase rate, a rate at which banks lend to one 
another and subsequently the prime lending rate, a rate at which firms fund their 
investments and operations, fluctuated significantly. ‘Over the last three decades we 
have also seen a drastic decrease in the prime lending rate, which peaked at 25% in 
the late 1980s and declined to 8-10% since 2010.’ (Slabbert, 2018). 
The South African bond market also underwent considerable change during this 
period. It was only in the late 1980s that the public debt market was established. 
Firms had few choices when considering capital structure, namely equity, bank 
financing or private funding. The limits to alternative financing allowed banks to 
extract additional value from a firm’s investments. This created a ‘hold-up cost of debt 
to the near-monopoly nature of their main fund supplier, banks’ (Ojah & Pillay, 2009). 
The development of the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA), which provided an 
additional and diversified source of capital to market participants, thus impacted 
capital structure decisions. As time progressed the BESA received their license which 
increased the accessibility of capital for South African firms, furthermore 
improvements in the efficiency of clearing and settling trades increased the 
attractiveness of the BESA. Non-residents were also better able to invest in the 
Country and consequently became active participants in the bond market, including 
primary and secondary debt issues. (Stals, 1999; Ojah & Pillay, 2009; Slabbert, 2018)  
Given the impact of events within the global and local environment, this paper serves 
to determine and analyse the changes in corporate leverage in South Africa and what 
factors contributed to these changes, for the period 1994 to 2016. Further, the paper 
will determine whether traditional capital structure determinants have a significant 
ability to predict the changes in capital structure.  
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1.3. Research Methodology 
 
The study uses a quantitative methodology to determine the correlation between the 
capital structure determinants of; firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, growth, the 
cost of debt and corporate tax rates to firm leverage, for the period 1994 – 2016. With 
the aim of determining the impact of capital structure determinants on the capital 
structure decision. A detailed outline of the research methodology is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
 
1.4. Brief Orientation and Chapter Overviews 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction and background to the research. Highlighting the 
problem statement, significance of study and methodology used. The literature review 
presented in Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework on capital structure theories, 
the determinants of the capital structure model, a look into the South African interest 
rate environment and debt market and, further the relationship between leverage and 
corporate performance.  
Chapter 3 will provide insight into the research design and methodology. Chapter 4 - 
analysis of results, provides a report of the interpretation of empirical findings of the 
data as per the methodology used. The final chapter within this study, Chapter 5, 
provides the main findings of the study, conclusion and areas for potential future 
studies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will investigate the extensive literature surrounding capital structure 
theory, and provides an analysis of appropriate capital structure determinants, 
including their relationship to capital structure theory and as such leverage.  
Further, the review will address the interest rate environment and capital market in 
South Africa. This will include a detailed discussion of South African interest rates and 
the Bond Exchange of South Africa. This will provide the necessary context and 
background for readers. In addition, an understanding of the circumstances in which 
South African managers were required to make optimal capital structure decisions.   
 
2.2 Capital Structure Theory 
 
Capital structure theory has been a topic of debate and extensive research, with 
many theories suggesting an optimal capital structure based on an understanding of 
the both the properties and information attributes of debt and equity financing. Capital 
structure research was pioneered by authors Modigliani and Miller in 1958. Their 
original paper, the ‘mother’ of capital structure theory, resulted in the development of 
numerous alternative capital structure theories. Many authors, searching for an 
optimal mix of debt and equity, continued to build on their research and understanding 
of capital structure.  
This section will identify and describe notable capital structure theories that are used 
to explain the capital structure choices of firms and application of capital structure 
theory to firms within real estate and REIT, travel and leisure and construction and 
materials sectors will be investigated. Emphasis will be placed on the relevance of 
capital structure theory to REITs, given their unique tax circumstances and mandatory 
distribution payments. The real estate and REIT sector accounts for 47 of the firms 
within this study, and 90% of the total sample’s market capitalisation at 2016. 
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2.2.1. Irrelevance Theory 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), the pioneers of capital structure theory, argued that a 
firm’s capital structure is irrelevant, in what is commonly known as the Capital 
Irrelevance Theory. The authors, known as M&M, divided their theory into two 
propositions. In their first proposition, aptly known as proposition 1, they set out 
determine how a change in capital structure would affect the value of a firm. Stating, 
importantly, that the value of a firm was determined by its cash flows. The study 
assumed the following; no taxes, no capital market frictions, in other words no 
transaction costs and no bankruptcy costs, symmetric access to credit markets, 
implying the same rate for borrowers and lenders, and that a firm’s financial policy 
revealed no information about that firm. 
Under perfect market conditions, the capital structure and financing decisions made 
by managers affected neither the cost of capital nor the market value of the firm. A 
firm’s cash flows determined the value of the firm and these cash flows were 
independent of capital structure, consequently leaving the firm’s value unaffected. 
Capital structure was therefore considered irrelevant.  
Proposition 2 addressed whether a change in capital structure would affect the 
associated cost of capital, otherwise known as the rate of return, required by debt and 
equity holders. The required rate of return on debt has traditionally been accepted as 
several times lower (even in the absence of taxes) than that of equity, therefore 
increasing debt in a firm’s capital structure would result in a lower cost of capital. 
Debt, however, was considered riskier and as such an increased use of debt would 
result in an increase in the required rate of return on equity. As a result of taking on 
additional risk, equity holders would demand an increase in the rate of return on their 
investment. Thus, any decrease in the cost of capital, as a result of an increased use 
of debt, would be exactly offset by an increase in the cost of equity. (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958; Karadeniz, Kandir, Balcilar & Onal, 2009). 
This theory, based on numerous assumptions, would have little relevance to the travel 
and construction sectors as they do not operate within a perfect market. Irrelevance 
theory, however, has relevance in the REIT sector as these firms are subject to 
limited or no taxes. It has therefore been argued that the value of any REIT would be 
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independent of its capital structure, thus supporting the capital structure irrelevance 
theory set out by M&M. (Ghosh, Nag & Sirmans, 2001)  
Subsequently, Modigliani and Miller begun relaxing their assumptions in order to 
determine what implications this would have for proposition 1 and 2. Income taxes 
were introduced into their model and the results indicated the following; in light of 
proposition 1, firms would benefit from 100% debt inclusion into their capital structure. 
As interest payments on debt are tax deductible, they would serve to shield earnings 
from tax and thus increase the firm’s value. The effect of income taxes on proposition 
2 would result in a decrease in the cost of capital as the tax rate would reduce the 
cost of debt. Thus, decreasing the firm’s cost of capital and increasing firm value. 
This, yet again, would motivate 100% debt financing due to the tax benefits.  
At this point, however, the authors continued to overlook the event of bankruptcy 
which would offset the income tax benefits associated with debt. Once accounted for, 
the increase risk of bankruptcy associated with debt would increase the cost of 
capital, thus eliminating any decrease as a result of the interest-tax shield. (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1958) 
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2.2.2. Trade-off Theory 
 
The advantages and disadvantage of incorporating debt into a firm’s capital structure 
had become apparent and motivated an optimal capital structure theory. This theory 
implied a firm was able to reach an optimal capital structure and change its value 
through altering its capital structure. This notion resulted in the trade-off theory. The 
basis of trade-off theory considered bankruptcy and financial distress costs as 
described by Myers (1977) and agency costs as explained by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Trade-off theory suggests that a firm establish a target capital structure and 
gradually move toward it. This target capital structure must account for both the 
benefits and risks associated with debt. As increased levels of debt result in an 
increase in bankruptcy costs, financial distress costs and agency costs for 
shareholders, it will result in a decrease in the value of the firm (negative trade-off). 
Debt, however, reduces the cost of capital as a result of the deductibility of interest 
payments against tax (positive trade-off). (Karadeniz, et al., 2009) 
In a study completed by Harrison, Panasian & Seiler, (2011), the authors describe 
trade-off theory as a trade-off theory between the marginal debt tax shield and 
marginal bankruptcy costs. This theory rests largely on the premise that firms can 
enjoy the benefits of an interest tax shield, this benefit, however, as highlighted by the 
authors, would not directly translate into the REIT market as they are able to legally 
avoid tax payments. Therefore, eliminating the theoretical benefits of the trade-off 
theory. This is supported by Ghosh, et al., (2001) who argue that firms with a marginal 
tax rate of zero, such as that of a REIT, would have a negative tax advantage of using 
debt. The benefits of trade off theory for REITs are therefore eliminated.  
Furthermore, REIT mandates often limited their operational activities to activities 
regarding real estate related assets, therefore limiting the diversification of their 
assets and increasing the risk of bankruptcy. Magnifying the risk of bankruptcy are, 
therefore, the nature of their assets, which are large often illiquid commercial property 
assets, ‘subject to cyclicality and vagaries of local property markets’ (Harrison, et al., 
2011). In addition, these assets are often complex to value and subject to unique 
financing arrangements and local market conditions. (Harrison, et al., 2011) 
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2.2.3. Pecking Order Theory 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) suggested a financing hierarchy on the 
basis of information asymmetry amongst managers and outside investors, which 
resulted in the pecking order theory. This theory indicates that investors generally 
have less information than management and that management would only issue 
equity if they considered it to be undervalued by the market. Thus, to avoid signalling 
impacts, management will prefer to use internal financing than external financing and 
as such the capital hierarchy arose, namely; 
1. Internal: Retained Income 
2. External: Debt Financing 
3. External: Equity financing 
As indicated, external sources of capital are subject to adverse selection as managers 
have more information than outside investors. ‘Outsiders are aware of their relative 
ignorance and demand a premium on their investment returns’ (Smith, 2010). As 
market participants are cognisant of the information asymmetries that exist, managers 
are forced to sell equity at a discount. Equity is thus considered the least preferred 
financing method. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Smith, 2010) 
The unique circumstances presented by the REIT sector, have implications for the 
applicability of the pecking order theory. REITs are required to distribute a given 
percentage of their distributable profits and as a result retained income is diminished. 
This, regulatory restriction, results in fewer capital options available to managers of 
REITs, namely external debt and or equity financing. Albeit, debt without the benefits. 
With this in mind, a study conducted by Ghosh, et al., (2001), for the period 1991 to 
1997 indicated that the share price changes of REITs are significantly and positively 
related to debt issues and furthermore the amount of debt issued. In general, debt 
issues are viewed in a positive light relative to equity, therefore supporting the notion 
of pecking order theory in practice. A study of European property companies, 
conducted by Brounen and Eichholtz (2001), found a similar negative price reaction to 
equity offerings and positive price adjustments on debt offerings. These reactions 
have been attributed to the pecking order theory’s information asymmetry and 
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alternative signalling explanations. Deviating momentarily, an alternative negative 
signalling theory of equity issuances has been documented as follows; 
o Implied cash flow change hypothesis  
This hypothesis suggests that raising external equity financing indicates to 
outside investors that internal cash flows have been insufficient, and possibly 
even disappointing. Furthermore, changing the financing policy may indicate that 
the firm’s future prospects are not as pleasing. The larger the equity issue the 
bigger the implied cash constraints and thus the greater the share price 
movement.  
 
o Debt market accessibility hypothesis  
This is an alternative hypothesis, suggesting that there are instances in which the 
post-equity issue share performance may be better than expected. This theory 
rests on the premise that investors have sound rationale regarding the risk 
associated with highly levered firms and will thus tolerate an equity issue. 
(Brounen & Eichholtz, 2001) 
 
As REITs are forced to obtain external funding, Ghosh, et al., (2001) arrive at a 
similar explanatory conclusion for the use the debt financing in REIT’s capital 
structure. The authors suggested the following; superior REITs will use their 
understanding of the market to issue debt and elicit a positive share price reaction, 
despite no obvious advantage to issuing debt (as discussed under the trade-off 
theory). Thus, separating themselves from other REITs who issue equity financing.  
An additional explanation, not taking into consideration share price reactions, is 
documented by Hardin and Wu (2010). The authors suggest that REITs wishing to 
establish sound banking relationships, which may assist in mitigating market frictions 
and improve overall capital acquisition processes, will obtain debt financing. Although 
debt may limit management’s operating and strategic options through the creation of 
debt covenants. Debt financing can also create trust, as firms who hold debt are more 
likely to be issued a credit rating and are subsequently able to issue public debt with 
greater flexibility or gain better access to public capital markets. In other words, an 
investment grade credit rating can create trust, decrease information asymmetries, 
reduce restrictive covenants and mitigate capital market friction enabling REITs to 
access liquidity and act quickly should they require projects and property financing.  
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2.2.4. Agency Theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory suggests that in a principal and agent 
relationship it may be unlikely that the agent will always act in the best interest of the 
principal, being the holders of debt or equity. The authors suggest, to align the 
interest of principal and agent, the principal can establish monitoring and control 
activities to limit wasteful activities of the agent. Agency costs can result between 
management and equity holders, in which management may tend to appropriate 
larger amounts of corporate resources in the form of perquisites, for their own 
consumption. Further to this management may avoid profitable investments as they 
require too much effort from management and as such firm value will be substantially 
lower. Budget restrictions and incentive schemes may assist in limiting unwanted 
behaviour.  
The introduction of debt into a firm’s capital structure may introduce additional agency 
concerns as managers choose to act in the best interest of equity holders, at the 
detriment of the interests of debt holders. In this instance, it is likely that management 
have an equity interest in the firm and as such choose their interests combined with 
those of other equity holders above the interests of debt holders. In these 
circumstances, an increase in debt encourages management to make riskier 
investments as losses will fall on the bondholders while gains will accrue to the 
shareholders. Debt holders, in these circumstances, may introduce restrictive 
covenants, to protect their interest. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Smith, 2010) 
Associated with agency cost is the asset substitution problem, in which shareholders 
encourage management of a company to invest in riskier assets to increase potential 
returns on equity, however at the expense of debt holders. Hardin and Wu (2010) 
indicate that property acquisitions are core to a REITs business model and as such 
an increase in unsecured lending may result in significant asset substitution concerns 
for REIT debt holders. Less secured debt implies greater risk, and banks may 
therefore impose restrictions to prevent asset substitution in REITs. 
Opposing arguments, suggest that debt is beneficial as it provides managers with the 
incentive to work harder, consume fewer perquisites, and make better investment 
decisions for the firm.  
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The reason being; management will focus their efforts on optimal decision making as 
they are cognizant of the firm’s interest and capital repayment requirements. Further 
to this, it has been suggested that managers’ who hold their careers and reputations 
in high esteem, will avoid excessive debt within their firm’s capital structure. Personal 
risk aversion will also deter management from taking on debt. (Smith, 2010) 
 
2.2.4.1 Free Cash Flow Theory  
 
Within agency theory it has been submitted that firms with significant levels of free 
cash flows tend to invest in wasteful and value destroying projects an example 
thereof, is the post equity issue slump presented by Brounen and Eichholtz (2001). 
The authors describe this well-known phenomenon in which a slump in operational 
profitability tends to occur in the year following a security issue. Thus, supporting 
agency theory in which managers have incentives to invest proceeds from external 
issues into unprofitable projects. Therefore, the free cash flow theory suggests that 
debt repayments are beneficial as they reduce the amount of free cash flow available 
for managers to waste. (Smith, 2010)  
A paper by Brown and Riddiough (2003) highlights that the free cash flow rationale 
bears little impact on a firm that is obliged to make mandatory dividend payments 
from distributable income, which would be the case for the REIT sector. This theory, 
however, would have relevance within the other sectors examined in this paper. 
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2.3 Capital Structure Determinants 
 
Capital structure theory sets the foundation from which many traditional capital 
structure determinants have been derived. Trade-off theory would suggest that the 
cost of debt and the corporate tax rate are significantly correlated to the use of 
leverage, and thus appropriate determinants of a firm’s capital structure. Pecking 
order theory is driven by information asymmetries which would subsequently drive the 
capital structure decisions of a firm. There have been numerous studies in which 
various capital structure determinants have been assessed against leverage in order 
to determine whether they are able to significantly predict a firm’s capital structure.  
This chapter will address the capital structure determinants used in various literature, 
which will serve to inform the method used in this study. Furthermore, addressing the 
relationship found between capital structure theory, capital structure determinants and 
leverage. Relevant studies, however not limited, will include those completed in the 
real estate, travel and construction sectors, given their relevance to this study. The 
suitability of determinants toward different leverage ratios, term structures of debt and 
the applicability across countries will be discussed.  
 
2.3.1. Capital Structure Determinants – Travel and Construction Sectors 
 
Karadeniz, et al., (2009) investigated the factors affecting capital structure decisions 
of lodging companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The data included 
five companies and 65 observations for the period 1994 to 2006. Their study 
accounted for eight capital structure determinants and one leverage method 
(dependent variable), namely the debt ratio, defined as the total book value of debt 
relative to the total book value of assets. Their study generated various hypothesis, 
given both the trade-off theory and pecking order theory.   
Table 1 will present the study’s eight capital structure determinants and the implied 
relationship that that determinant has with each of the capital structure theories. As 
seen in Table 1, the study hypothesised the following; 
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Table 1: Capital structure determinants & their relation to capital structure theory 
 
Determinant Trade off theory  Pecking order theory 
Firm Size 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Larger firms are better 
diversified and as such have 
lower probability of financial 
distress, thus allowing them 
to take advantage of debt. 
 
 Negative Relationship 
 
Information asymmetries are 
lower for larger firms and as 
such they are able to issue 
equity without being 
penalised extensively.  
 
Tangibility 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Fixed assets would serve as 
collateral for debt financing 
and as a result firms have 
better debt capacity. 
 
 Negative Relationship 
 
Fixed assets have lower 
information asymmetries 
and as such firms would rely 
on equity financing.  
 
Profitability  
 Positive Relationship 
 
High profitability decreases 
the risk of financial distress 
in a firm and allows for 
greater borrowing capacity. 
 
 Negative Relationship 
 
Profitability will result in 
increased earnings available 
for use in the firm’s capital 
structure.   
 
Growth Opportunities 
 
(market to book ratio of the 
firm) 
 Negative Relationship 
 
As growth opportunities 
bear greater risk and higher 
financial distress costs, high 
growth firms would prefer 
equity financing.  
 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Higher growth opportunities 
would imply a positive 
relationship as greater 
financing would be utilised. 
  
 
Commercial Trade Position  Not specified  Negative Relationship 
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Determinant Trade off theory  Pecking order theory 
Effective Tax Rate 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Debt results in increased 
interest payments resulting 
in a decrease in the 
effective tax rate.  
 
 Not specified   
Non-debt Tax Shield  Negative Relationship  Negative Relationship 
Free Cash Flow 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Large free cash flows are 
associated with lower risk 
and as such borrowing 
capacity increases. 
 
 Negative Relationship 
 
An increase in free cash 
would provide an increase in 
internal capital available for 
use.  
 
 
⃰ Results of the study by, Karadeniz et al. (2009), have been highlighted in blue above. 
The actual findings of their study, highlighted in blue, indicate that tangibility of assets, 
the effective tax rate and profitability are negatively related to the debt ratio. The 
remainder of the determinants for their sample appeared to have no relationship to 
the debt ratio.  The findings partially support pecking order theory, however, neither 
the trade-off nor the pecking order theory are exactly explained in this model. 
Moreover, they noted that lodging companies are capital intensive as they require 
huge capital outlays at the investment and operating stages, making frequent, 
replacement, expansion and modernisation investments in order to meet challenging 
consumer behaviour. (Karadeniz, et al., 2001) 
Moving our attention toward the construction sector, Baharuddin, Khamis, Mahmood 
and Dollah (2011), completed a study of the debt and equity structure for a sample of 
construction firms listed in the Bursa Malaysia market for the period 2001 to 2007. 
Their sample included 42 companies and 294 observations, their dependant variable, 
similar to the study above was the debt ratio. Their study accounted for the following 
capital structure determinants; asset tangibility, growth, firm size and profitability and 
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documented the implied relationship between capital structure theories; trade-off and 
pecking order theory and the determinants. Table 2 presents the determinants used, 
the relationship implied by each of the capital structure theories and the results of 
their testing. The documentation and results indicated the following;  
 
Table 2: Summary of findings for Capital Structure Determinants in Construction  
Determinant Trade off theory  Pecking order theory 
Firm Size 
 Positive Relationship 
 
 Not specified 
 
Finding: Larger firms rely more on debt financing, thus supporting the trade-off 
theory which indicates that larger firms have greater debt capacity. 
 
Tangibility 
 Positive Relationship 
 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Finding: With increased asset tangibility the demand for debt, to finance these 
assets, also increased. This is consistent with both capital structure 
theories, per the author’s interpretation of the relationship between 
tangibility and capital structure theory.  
 
Profitability 
 Positive Relationship 
 
 Negative Relationship 
 
Finding: The study found that an increase in the use of debt, resulted in lower 
profitability and therefore an inverse relationship was noted. 
 
Growth  
 Not specified 
 
 Positive Relationship 
 
Finding: It was found that, construction companies depend heavily on debt 
financing compared to that of equity to fund expansion and growth. 
 
 
⃰ Results of the study by, Baharuddin et al., (2011), have been highlighted in blue 
above. 
In light the table, their results, as highlighted in blue, support both the trade-off and 
pecking order theories, notably, the findings suggest that as construction firms grow in 
terms of size and asset base, these firms will rely on debt financing, more so than 
equity. The capital structure determinants employed in this study, echo those used by 
Karadeniz, et al., in the study of lodging firms. (Baharuddin, et al., 2011) 
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2.3.2. Capital Structure Determinants – Real Estate and REIT Sector  
 
In the same year, a study completed by Harrison, et al. (2011), examined the 
determinants of capital structure of real estate investment trusts (REITs). Their 
sample comprised REITs listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange or the NASDAQ for any duration of the sample period, 1998 to 2008. As 
noted in the introduction to this study REITs in both the US and SA are statutorily 
permitted to avoid the payment of income taxes, thus eliminating the corporate tax 
rate as an appropriate capital structure determinant.   
The dependent variable in the study was the ratio of total book value of debt to the 
sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. The study was in depth and 
included numerous predicting variables, categorised as; traditional capital structure 
determinants, additional capital structure determinants, REIT organisational 
characteristics, REIT operating and financing characteristics and REIT competing 
capital structure theory variables.  
Dissimilar to the studies addressed above and below, Harrison et al., (2011) includes 
an additional capital structure theory, namely market timing. This theory indicates that 
management will time the market in order to take advantage of pricing discrepancies 
in the external equity market. Different to the pecking order theory, it is believed that if 
information asymmetries are sufficiently pronounced, they will allow firms to profitably 
issue equity. As such, this theory would hypothesis a negative relationship between a 
firm’s market to book ratio and leverage, as undervalued firms, would have higher 
market to book ratios, increased equity offerings and therefore less debt.  
The results of their study found that REIT capital structure is, to a large extent, driven 
by traditional capital structure determinants that would ordinary influence the 
decisions of non-REIT sectors. The expected relationship, given the expectations 
implied by capital structure theory and the results of the study have been summarised 
in Table 3. Similar, to Table 1 and Table 2, the results of their testing have been 
highlighted in blue.  
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Table 3: Summary of findings for Traditional Capital Structure Determinants in REITs 
Determinant Trade off  Market timing Pecking order  
Firm Size   Positive   Positive   Negative   
Finding: Their finding supports both trade-off and market timing theories. 
 
Tangibility   Positive   Positive   Negative   
Finding: A positive relationship was found. This supports the theory that 
REITs have increased debt capacity given the increased collateral 
provided by their significant fixed asset base. 
 
Profitability    Positive   Positive   Positive  
Finding: Harrison, believes that profitable firms will want to avoid the 
negative signalling associated with equity issuances, and therefore 
issue debt. A negative, overall relationship has been found, 
supporting neither capital structure theory, nor the pecking order 
theory. 
 
Growth   Negative    Negative    Positive  
Finding: Their finding supports both trade-off and market timing theories. 
 
Cost of Debt  Negative    Not specified  Not specified  
Finding: A negative relationship was found as an increased cost of 
borrowing reduces a REITs use of debt financing.  
 
Information Opacity  Not specified  Not specified  Positive  
Finding: Equity has negative signalling connotations, an increase in 
information opacity, would result in firms avoiding equity issuances, 
and increasing debt. No evidence of a significant relationship was 
found, thus neglecting the predictions of the pecking order. 
 
 
⃰ Results of the study by, Harrison et al., (2011), have been highlighted in blue above. 
30 | P a g e  
 
Furthermore, through the inclusion of other ‘non-traditional’ capital structure 
determinants in their study, they were able to conclude that the firms’ debt capacity 
varies according to the unique operating and financing mechanisms of REITs. For 
example, REITs with primary investments in Commercial properties such as 
residential and malls would have higher debt ratios, whereas REITs investing in 
storage units exhibit lower debt ratios. (Harrison, et al., 2011) 
Having discussed the cost of debt, only rarely in the literature, an additional study, in 
support of Harrison’s findings, was conducted by Kumar and Bodla (2014). This study 
addressed capital structure in developing countries and supports the hypothesis that 
firms are less likely to rely on debt, when the cost of borrowing increases. This 
negative relationship between the cost of debt and leverage, supports the trade-off 
theory.  
This study, comparable to those conducted in the travel and construction sectors, 
draws attention to the importance of traditional capital structure determinants in the 
investigation of a firm’s debt equity choice. In addition, Harrison, provides readers 
with assurance that traditional capital structure determinants have relevance in the 
REIT sector. 
 
  
31 | P a g e  
 
2.3.2.1. Real Estate and REITs in the absence of taxes  
 
Sbeti and Moosa (2012) conduct a study in which they investigate appropriate capital 
structure determinants in the absence of taxes. This study is of interest, given the 
inclusion of the real estate and REIT sector in this paper. Their study forms its 
premise on the following statement; Modigliani and Miller’s trade-off theory rests 
heavily on the proposition that interest on debt is deductible for tax purposes. 
Therefore, in light of trade-off theory and in the absence of taxes, there is little basis 
for real estate and REIT firms to hold debt. As such they set out to determine which 
factors would influence leverage within a firm’s capital structure. The authors use an 
analysis method known as Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to identify which 
determinants are important. Their study used leverage as the dependant variable 
across a sample of firms listed on the Kuwaiti stock exchange. Their analysis 
accounted for firm size, liquidity, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, payout 
ratio, share price performance, firm age and income variability. The results indicate 
that profitability and growth opportunities are important determinants of capital 
structure. Further their results were more supportive of the pecking order theory which 
suggested leverage is negatively related to profitability and positively related to 
growth opportunities. (Sbeti & Moosa, 2012) 
A similar article, by Smith (2010), investigated the capital structure determinants for 
tax-exempt organisations in the United States, the study was large, including 63 970 
firms from the year 1998 to 2003. The sample included religious organisations and 
education firms as these firm’s debt ratios are unaffected by corporate income taxes. 
Smith (2010) calculated two debt ratios, namely the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets and financial debt relative to financial capital. The findings indicated that the 
following determinants were positively related to debt; asset tangibility, growth and 
firm size and profitability, liquidity and firm age had a negative relationship to firm 
leverage. This is consistent with Sbeti and Moosa (2012). An overall finding indicated 
that the debt ratios for tax exempt entities are lower than those of taxable firms, the 
average ratio of financial debt to total assets for tax exempt firms was 16%, with a 
range of 4% - 23%. While taxable firms had a mean ratio of 25% - 27%.  
Smith (2010) concludes that the findings of his study are broadly consistent with the 
predictions of each trade-off, pecking order and agency cost theories. The positive 
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relationship between growth, firm size and asset tangibility and leverage, the former 
determinant being consistent with pecking order theory while the latter determinants 
are consistent with the trade-off theory. The negative relationship between leverage 
and the age, profitability and liquidity of the firm are consistent with the predictions of 
the pecking order theory and agency cost theories.  
Smith (2010), included an interesting determinant into his study, namely ‘a 
percentage of officers, directors, trustees and key employees that are paid’, the 
rationale for including this determinant into the study is as follows; it is suggested that 
only board members of tax-exempt firms who work without a salary are able to 
convincingly validate that they are motivated to take their decision making ability 
seriously. In other words, these employees have greater motivation to act in the best 
interest of the firm as they are not influenced by the mechanics of a remuneration 
structure. Therefore, if increased debt financing can reduce wasteful expenditure, 
then trade-off theory suggests that decision makers with greater discipline will use 
more debt. This theory, therefore predicts a negative relationship between debt use 
and managers who are paid. Managers who are paid would not want the constraint of 
interest payments associated with debt financing. Pecking order theory would also 
predict a negative relationship between the two, as disciplined managers, i.e. those 
who are not entitled to a salary would use more debt, whereas salaried individuals 
would use less. The finding, however, unique to tax-exempt firms found that debt is 
positively related to the percentage of officers, directors, trustees and key employees 
that are paid. 
Debt is used to encourage efficient decision making when decision makers take their 
guardianship role seriously, thus this finding is inconsistent with trade-off theory. 
Similar, this is inconsistent with the pecking order theory as debt is known to 
encourage managerial self-discipline. Management, with seemingly less discipline as 
result of receiving remuneration will take on greater amounts of leverage. ‘It is unclear 
why insiders would choose to discipline themselves in the absence of any kind of 
market for corporate controls. One explanation for this would be that outside donors 
require some amount of debt financing to encourage decision makers to run the 
organisation more effectively.’ (Smith, 2010) 
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2.3.3. Capital Structure Determinants – Across Sectors 
 
Moving toward more general studies, Noulas and Genimakis (2011), conducted a 
study of the determinants of capital structure choice of Greek listed companies, their 
sample included various sectors, including both travel and construction, however, 
excluded real estate companies. The data set comprised 259 firms, for the period 
1998 to 2006, their study included leverage ratios similar to those used in this paper; 
long term debt to equity, total bank debt to equity and total liabilities to equity and 9 
capital structure determinants, being; firm age, size, profitability, price volatility, asset 
tangibility, depreciation, growth rate, credit rating and classification of economic 
activities. Their findings are as follows; the three leverage measures were significantly 
negatively related to the age of the firm, while a significant positive relationship was 
found with sales and credit rating for the entire sample.  
Additional findings indicated significant positive correlations between leverage and 
sales, growth rate, tangibility, depreciation, volatility and credit rating. A negative 
relationship occurred between profitability and the firm’s age. Most of these findings 
support the pecking order theory, more specifically the positive relationship between 
profitability and growth. Although, the findings differed significantly across leverage 
measure used and sector. (Noulas & Genimakis, 2011) 
A study accounting for the lack of research conducted in emerging markets, also 
concluded that the pecking order theory better explained the changes in debt levels. 
The study looked at evidence of capital determinants in Poland. The analyses 
focused on the years 2002 to 2012, comprising 111 companies listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange. ‘The results indicate that there is evidence of a significant negative 
relationship among the size of a company, its growth rate, profitability, tangibility and 
the level of total debt. The study shows positive relationship between growth 
prospects of the company and the debt levels’ (Kazmierska-Jozwiak, Marszalek & 
Sekula, 2015). The authors established that firms with a higher share of fixed assets 
had a lower propensity to incur debt, despite the opportunity to obtain favourable debt 
financing, as a result of increased collateral. Thus, implying managers wish to finance 
their fixed assets with equity of an unspecified maturity date. This supports the 
pecking order theory, in addition to the negative relationship between leverage and 
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size and profitability. These firms prefer internal equity financing over debt. 
(Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et.al., 2015)  
Chipeta (2016) also addresses traditional capital structure determinants in an 
emerging market, namely South Africa. The paper is aimed at analysing capital 
structure behaviour of firm’s engaging in Initial Public Offerings on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, in doing so they investigate firms that successfully concluded an 
IPO on the exchange for the years 1996 to 2011. In addition, they determine which 
capital structure determinants impact leverage. Their key findings, suggest that, post 
initial-IPO firm behaviour is consistent with target trade-off theory, as their key 
findings indicated that on average, IPO firms adjust faster to an optimal capital 
structure target than seasoned firms. Further, they conclude that firm size, 
profitability, growth and asset tangibility are significant in explaining the capital 
structure of IPOs on the JSE. 
The results are unlike those of Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et al., (2015). While the author 
concludes that profitable firms borrow less, relative to the total debt ratio, other 
findings indicate a significant positive relationship between firm size, asset tangibility, 
growth and profitability (when the dependant variable is the long term debt ratio).  The 
positive relationship between size, tangibility and profitability support the trade-off 
theory, as they increase the firm’s ability to borrow and satisfy the need for profitable 
firms to protect their earnings from tax. 
The author provides an argument for both a possible negative or positive relationship 
between asset tangibility and leverage, and while the results indicated a positive 
relationship, consistent with trade-off theory, they provide several reasons, for a 
negative relationship, which may provide additional support for the findings of 
Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et al., (2015). A negative relationship may indicate that firms 
with high collateral value of assets are already highly levered and as such prefer 
equity to avoid additional probability of financial distress. Further, tangible assets 
provide a firm with a non-debt tax shield as a result of the deductibility of asset 
allowances against taxable income. These firms, therefore, do not rely on the interest 
tax shield associated with debt.  
The significant and positive relationship of leverage to IPO firms with high growth 
prospects, contradict the trade-off theory, as growth opportunities are associated with 
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greater financial risk, and suggest alternatively that IPO firms have greater credibility 
as a result of their equity listing and as such introduce additional debt into their capital 
structure. This is consistent with the pecking order theory. (Chipeta, 2016) 
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2.3.4. Capital Structure Determinants – Global Literature  
 
Two similar studies, broadly addressing capital structure determinants around the 
World, conducted in 2008 and 2015, investigate the leverage choices of firms in 42 
and 37 countries, respectively. The earlier study found that firm-specific determinants 
of leverage, such as tangibility, firm size, risk, profitability and growth opportunities, 
differ across countries. Furthermore, de Jong, Kabir & Nguyen (2008) ‘find that 
institutional differences between developed and developing countries explain a large 
portion of the variation in the use of long term debt. They also observe that some 
institutional factors in developing countries influence the leverage of large and small 
firms differently’ (de Jong, et.al., 2008). 
Nonetheless, the findings indicated, consistent with predictions of conventional capital 
structure theories, that firm-specific predictors of size, tangibility, risk, growth and 
profitability were significant on cross-country capital structure.  
The later study undertook to determine which capital structure determinants, across 
different countries, are reliable predictors of leverage. Finding that, size, tangibility, 
industry leverage, profits and inflation are reliable determinants of capital structure. 
These findings are similar in nature to the first study. (de Jong, et.al., 2008; Oztekin, 
2015) 
To corroborate de Jong’s findings, an earlier study of the capital structure 
determinants in the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy in 2003, found; firms in developed 
versus less developed markets have different approaches to capital structure theory. 
Their results indicated that firms in well-developed financial markets, such as the UK, 
have long term target debt ratios that they adjust toward, whereas firms in less 
developed and thus less efficient financial markets, such as in Italy, appear to place 
less importance on the search for an optimal capital structure. (Panno, 2003) 
The final study in this review, completed by Bevan and Danbolt (2002), address the 
impact of capital structure determinants and the differences thereof on long term and 
short term debt. The study investigates the following four leverage measures in order 
to arrive at their findings; Non-equity liabilities to total assets (total debt plus trade 
payables over total assets and the excess market value of equity), debt to total assets 
(total debt over total assets adjusted for the difference between the market value of 
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equity less book value of equity), debt to capital (total debt over total debt plus market 
value of equity and preference shares) and adjusted debt to adjusted capital (adjusted 
debt being total debt less liquid assets and adjusted capital removing accounting 
specific balances, such as provisions, deferred tax and intangible assets). The 
rationale for removing liquid assets, such as cash and marketable securities, is that 
these items are extra liquidity of the firm and as such could and may be used to 
reduce debt within the firm, immediately. Further, accounting liabilities such as 
deferred tax and provisions result in a decline in equity (retained earnings), with no 
associated cash flow for these balances, they are, therefore, added back to equity to 
better reflect the equity capital of the firm. Intangible assets are removed, as they may 
be significantly inflated by accounting goodwill.  
The study incorporates the following capital structure determinants into their model; 
growth opportunities (market to book ratio), firm size, profitability and tangibility. Their 
results indicated that the level of leverage utilised by UK firms differed significantly 
depending on which measure of leverage was adopted. Further, their study indicated 
that determinants of leverage vary significantly depending on the nature of the debt 
being analysed. Their conclusions were based on the following results; while a 
significant positive relationship was found between leverage and firm size and asset 
tangibility this was only relative to long-term debt forms, this, however, differed when 
adjusting for short term debt. The leverage measure, adjusted for short term 
borrowings, resulted in a negative relationship between the firm size and leverage. 
When adjusting the leverage measure for trade payables, the relationship between 
asset tangibility and leverage was negative. These results may be explained as 
follows; smaller firms have difficulty in obtaining favourable long term debt financing 
(as larger firms have a negative relationship to leverage when adjusted for short term 
debt), and participate in maturity matching of tangible assets to long term debt, 
respectively.  
These results indicate the significant differences that may result from the use of 
different leverage measures for both long and short term debt and allude to the 
importance of decomposing an analysis into long and short term components. (Bevan 
& Danbolt, 2002) 
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2.3.5. Capital Structure Determinants – Summary 
 
The variety of literature presented, while extensive and based on different sectors can 
be summarised to draw attention to the most commonly used determinants and their 
relationship to leverage, furthermore, the supported capital structure theory. This has 
been summarised in Table 4 and a consensus determined. This will be used to inform 
both the Method, per Chapter 3 and the Results, as presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 4: Summary of findings across the Literature Review 
Determinant Author  Relationship Theory 
Firm Size 
 
Smith 
Baharuddin et al. 
Harrison et al. 
Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
Chipeta 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
 
(2010) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
(2015) 
(2016) 
(2018) 
 
Positive 
Positive  
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
 
● Positive 
 
 
Trade-off 
Trade-off  
Trade-off 
Pecking Order 
Trade-off 
Trade-off 
 
● Trade-off 
 
Tangibility   
 
Karadeniz et al. 
Smith 
Baharuddin et al. 
Harrison et al. 
Noulas & Genimakis 
Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
Chipeta 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
(2009) 
(2010) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
(2015) 
(2016) 
(2018) 
 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive  
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
 
● Positive 
 
 
Pecking Order 
Trade-off 
T.O. & Pecking  
Trade-off 
Trade-off 
Pecking Order 
Trade-off 
Pecking Order 
 
● Trade-off 
Profitability 
 
Karadeniz et al. 
Smith 
Baharuddin et al. 
Noulas & Genimakis  
 
(2009) 
(2010) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
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Determinant Author  Relationship Theory 
Profitability 
 
Sbeti & Moosa 
Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
Chipeta 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
 
(2012) 
(2015) 
(2016) 
(2018) 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 
● Negative 
 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
 
● Pecking Order 
 
Growth 
 
Smith 
Baharuddin et al. 
Harrison et al. 
Noulas & Genimakis 
Sbeti & Moosa 
Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
Chipeta 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
 
(2010) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
(2011) 
(2012) 
(2015) 
(2016) 
(2018) 
 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative  
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
 
● Positive 
 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Trade-off 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order  
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
Pecking Order 
 
● Pecking Order  
Cost of Debt 
 
Harrison et al. 
Kumar & Bodla 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
 
(2011) 
(2014) 
(2018) 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
 
● Negative 
 
Trade-off 
Trade-off 
Trade-off 
 
● Trade-off 
 
Tax Rate 
 
Karadeniz et al. 
Slabbert 
 
Consensus: 
 
 
(2009) 
(2018) 
 
Negative 
Negative  
 
● Negative 
 
Neither  
Neither 
 
● Neither 
 
 
Commonly, the positive relationship between capital structure determinants; firm size 
and tangibility to leverage, support the beliefs of the trade-off theory. Also, in support 
of this theory, the negative relationship commonly found between the cost of debt and 
leverage. Profitability, having a negative and growth, a positive relationship to 
40 | P a g e  
 
leverage is in support of the financing hierarchy as described by the pecking order 
theory. Last, the tax rate had a negative correlation to leverage, supporting neither the 
trade-off theory, nor the pecking order theory, at this point.  
The commonly identified and traditional capital structure determinants will be utilized 
in this study, as the Method, found in Chapter 3. Further, Chapter 3 will elaborate on 
the measure that will be used for each of these determinants and reinforce the 
relationship implied by the capital structure theories, such as the trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory. Quantitative research will be conducted in Chapter 4 and the 
results thereof presented and interpreted, based on our understanding of the literature 
presented above.  
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2.4. Capital Structure and Corporate Performance  
 
For decades authors have employed capital structure determinants into their models, 
based on their explanatory value toward firm leverage. Similar, studies have 
attempted to determine whether a firm’s leverage explains corporate performance. 
Thus, emphasising the importance of capital structure, this section will review various 
studies that have investigated the following hypothesis; whether capital structure 
decisions of firms have a direct impact on their financial performance. Two studies 
have been conducted with direct emphasis on the research at hand. The studies 
focus on the relationship between capital structure and performance within the REITs 
and construction industry. 
 
2.4.1 Capital Structure and Performance for Real Estate and REITs 
 
Ott, Riddiough and Yi (2005) investigated investment decisions and associated 
investment performance of a sample of REITs in the US for the period 1981 to 1999. 
They attempted to determine whether REITs are able to add value over and above 
their cost of capital, which is a direct result of their capital structure choices. This was 
measured using the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Their findings concluded, that while 
there was a positive relationship between investment performance and capital 
structure investments for the period 1985 to 1999, this relationship was not 
particularly strong. The average return to the sector, over and above the cost of 
capital, was between 1.6% and 2.9% per annum. A notable finding, however, was that 
investments were financed primarily through equity and long term debt. External debt 
and equity accounted of 84% of aggregate investment over the entire sample period.  
According Van Zyl (2010), SA REITs, for the period 2000 to 2009, had an average 
ratio of share to total capital of 58.17% and long term debt to total capital averaged 
35.53%, while short term debt relative to total capital was 1.48%. Real estate 
investment and services displayed the following; an average of 22.04%, 70.79% and 
2.49% for the same ratios, respectively. While these studies do not cover the same 
time horizon, have similar findings; Real Estate and REITs fund investments and 
operations predominantly through the use of long term debt and equity, while the use 
of Short Term Debt relative to Total Capital is negligible. (Van Zyl, 2010)  
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The findings based on the sample reviewed in this paper, for the period 1994 to 2016, 
indicate that long term debt as a percentage of total debt averaged 88.37%, while 
short term debt relative to total debt averaged a mere 5.57% for the period. These 
results consider both the REIT and real estate investments and services sector on the 
JSE and corroborate the evidence presented above. For the detailed discussion of 
results see Chapter 4: Results. 
 
2.4.2 Capital Structure and Performance for Construction Companies 
 
In 2009, San and Heng (2009) performed a study of how capital structure drives 
performance of the Malaysian Construction Sector. A total of 49 construction 
companies were investigated, for the period 2005 to 2008. Overall the results 
indicated a relationship between capital structure and corporate performance. 
The sample, more specifically, was divided into three categories based on the size of 
the construction firm and the following results were found;  
o Large Construction Companies; Return on Capital (ROC) and Earnings per 
Share (EPS) have a significant relationship with capital structure. Furthermore, 
long term debt and total debt to equity have the greatest impact on the corporate 
performance of larger construction firms. 
 
o Medium Construction Companies; it was concluded that only long term debt to 
common equity (LDCE) had a direct impact on corporate performance of these 
firms, as the relationship between LDCE and the companies’ operating margin 
was positive. Further, medium companies’ performances were affected by the 
changes in capital structure, but to a lesser extent than large companies were.  
 
o Small Construction Companies; the study found that total debt to capital had an 
impact on corporate performance, and a significant relationship was found 
between EPS and capital structure. Specifically, debt capital had a direct impact 
on the EPS performance of small companies.  
Overall the findings indicate that holdings of debt financing impact firm performance, 
specifically ratios; return on capital, earnings per share and firm operating margin. 
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2.4.3 Capital Structure and Performance for various firms – Ghana & Jordan 
 
A study performed in the same year, investigated whether capital structure impacted 
the performance of listed firms in Ghana. Ghana, having relevance to this study as an 
emerging market. These findings may serve to inform the findings in a South African 
context, as a prominent emerging market.  
These firms were not sector specific and the sample accounted for a total of 22 firms 
which were listed from 1998 to 2002. Their findings were detailed and differed 
depending on the type of capital employed by the firm and included; a significant 
positive relationship between the ratio of short term debt to total assets and return on 
equity (ROE) (profitability), a negative relationship between the ratio of long term debt 
to total assets and ROE, furthermore a positive relationship between total debt to total 
assets (debt ratio) and ROE.  It was also found that firms depend more on short term 
debt as their main source of financing. A high portion, namely 85% of total debt is 
represented by short term debt. (Abor, 2005) 
These findings, differ to those of Ott, et al. (2005), and support the notion that short 
term debt tends to be less expensive relative to long term debt, therefore increasing 
short term debt relative to long term debt, will lead to an increase in profits. Short term 
debt used in ordinary course of business, attracts a lower interest rate, thus 
increasing the bottom line. Long term debt is relatively more expensive as it carries a 
greater risk of default across the longer term. 
In the final study, contradictory results were found in a sample of Jordanian 
companies during the period 1989 and 2003. Jordan, an emerging market, may 
provide insight into the South African findings presented in Chapter 4.  
The study was completed by Zeitun and Tian (2007) who investigated the impact that 
capital structure had on the corporate performance of these Jordanian firms. The 
firms’ capital structure had a significantly negative relationship to the firms’ 
performance metrics, considering both accounting and market measures of 
performance. There was, however, a positive and significant effect between short 
term debt to total assets and the performance of these firms. This finding supports the 
argument presented above; short term debt is less costly than long term debt and the 
use thereof relative to long term debt has a beneficial impact on firm performance. 
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The use of short term debt can bolster earnings as finance costs are presumably 
lower. 
Contradictory findings within emerging markets, may be a result of external shocks; 
the author brought readers’ attention the large number of external shocks in the 
Middle East that would have impacted the Jordanian economy during the period of 
the study. In conclusion, firm performance may be impacted by capital structure 
decisions. 
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2.5 South African Interest Rate Environment  
 
While capital structure determinants can explain the variability in the use of debt, and 
debt the performance of corporates. Macro-economic conditions, including interest 
rates and exogenous economic shocks, would play a role in a firm’s decision-making 
process. South African interest rates have fluctuated considerably, with a marked 
decline in the prime rate from a high of 25% in late 1980 to a stable 8% - 10% since 
2010. (Slabbert, 2018) Fluctuating interest rates would no doubt pose additional 
challenges to managers’ capital structure decisions. An analysis of the South African 
interest rate environment will provide context to this study and the results thereof. 
This chapter will provide insight into the history and significant of interest rates in 
South Africa.  
 
2.5.1. A New Era – Democracy and the East Asian Crisis 
 
In 1995, Stals, the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank addressed the topic 
of interest rates; by documenting the basic mechanics of economics’ supply and 
demand. He noted that, given economic theory, an increased demand side for 
loanable funds and an unmatched supply of loanable funds will have the effect of 
increasing interest rates and vice versa.  The mechanism of the Reserve Bank may, 
however, influence the level of interest rates through monetary policy, for example the 
reserve bank can set high interest rates to control increasing inflation. Stals, further 
indicated that South Africa experienced net capital outflows to the rest of the World 
from 1985 to 1993 which decreased loanable funds arising from domestic savings 
and foreign investment.  
Post-apartheid, a net capital inflow into South Africa arose, resulting in a lower 
interest rate. ‘Large Amounts of capital of a short term nature flowed into the country, 
exerted upward pressure on the exchange rate of the Rand, increased domestic 
liquidity and depressed interest rates’ (Stals, 1996B). Real interest rates in South 
Africa, however remained high at this stage. Given the high need for funding, low 
corporate savings and sanctions on South Africa, i.e. the underlying supply and 
demand conditions. (Stals, 1995) 
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In 1996, Stals reinforced the notion that interest rates are driven by both the needs of 
borrowers and the demands of lenders, and the interplay thereof. As described, in 
order to achieve an equilibrium, the significant demand for funds by firms, private and 
government parties (demand) must be met with loanable funds which arise from 
savings and foreign investment (supply). At this point, little savings and increased 
spending in the economy was resulting in high interest rates and high inflation rates. 
A high inflationary environment was considered unfavourable and would have been 
perpetuated if the Reserve Bank had lowered interest rates. The reserve bank was, 
therefore, hesitant to intervene i.e. manipulate rates downward and as such interest 
rates remained high during 1996. 
More specifically, the high demand for short term funds, resulted in an increase in 
short term interest rates from relatively lower rates in early 1994 of 10% to 14% in 
mid-1995 and 16% in early 1996. More specifically the yield on three-month Treasury 
bills increased from 12.5% in December 1994 to 14.2% in June 1995. The repurchase 
rate increased by 200 basis points over this same period and bank credit lines peaked 
at 19.5% in June 1995. These rates decreased only marginally going forward.  
Long term rates followed the following trend; the yield on long term government 
instruments declined from 16.7% in June 1995 to a lower 13.7% in January 1996. 
Foreign capital inflows diminished, and a shortage of foreign exchange developed as 
a result of the large fiscal deficit that South Africa was experiencing, thus resulting in 
the upward pressure on interest rates. To alleviate the high interest rate environment, 
it would have been imperative for government to increase savings and reduce the 
fiscal deficit, failing this, market forces would need to take effect to restore equilibrium 
and aid in lowering interest rates. (Stals, 1996B) 
The economic landscape incurred positive changes in 1997 as inflows of foreign 
capital gained momentum. Foreign investors were responsible for R34 billion net 
purchases of bonds and equity. This allowed South African private investors to re-
allocate their SA assets to foreign assets, thus stabilising the exchange rate. Interest 
rates also begun to decline from early 1997 given the above market effects and a 
slowdown of credit extensions to the public sector. The Reserve Bank eased 
monetary policy during the year by decreasing the repurchase rate by 100 basis 
points to 16% and overall the economy experienced gradual increases in money 
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market liquidity and declines of market interest rates, for example long term 
government bonds and Treasury bills.  
The conditions detailed above were short lived as turmoil in the currency and capital 
markets onset in late-1997. Overheated East Asian economies overflowed into South 
Africa, resulting in a sell off of foreign investment in bonds and equities, again 
applying upward pressure on interest rates. (Stals, 1997A) Once again, market forces 
of higher savings and reduced government spending were required to alleviate high 
interest rates and encourage market discipline. The Reserve Bank remained hesitant 
to intervene. 
The East Asian crisis, was an example of why excessive credit extension can result in 
a financial crisis; East Asian controls regarding lending were relaxed as banks were 
allowed to maintain low interest rates while extending excessive amounts of credit 
into the market. Foreign borrowings were increased to supply the extra liquidity, 
however as foreign investors became weary, liquidity dried up and the financial 
system could no longer be supported. (Stals, 1998A) 
Extremely high interest rates continued into 1998, ‘when non-residents reviewed their 
investment strategy and started to withdraw some of the funds they had previously 
invested in South African bonds. During the four months: January to April 1998, non-
resident investors increased their holdings of South African bonds by approximately 
R16 billion. Over the next four months, from May to August 1998, they reduced their 
holdings of South African bonds by approximately R19 billion’. (Stals, 1998B) Interest 
rates reacted almost immediately, as investor confidence in emerging markets 
declined, presumably driven by the East-Asian crisis. 
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2.5.2. A New Millennium – 2000s and the US sub-prime Crisis 
 
As South Africa entered the new Millennium, interest rate behaviour was erratic, the 
yield on long term government bonds fell to 13.3% in early 2000, from a high of 18.3% 
in late 1998, this was influenced by low-inflation, fiscal discipline and a positive 
assessment by international ratings agencies. By May 2000 the daily average yield on 
long term bonds had shifted upwards to reach 15.2% before returning to more stable 
conditions at 13.7% in August 2000.  
‘As a result of the changes in long-term and short-term interest rates, the relatively flat 
yield curve at the beginning of 1999 assumed a steep positive slope over the next 
eighteen months. This reflected an easing of the monetary policy stance and, in the 
first five months of 2000, higher long-term yields and interest rates. From the end of 
May 2000, the differential between long-term and short-term yields began to decline 
again.’ (Stals, 2000) 
In 2002, the South African Reserve Bank, accused of having deliberate policy that 
caused the high interest rate environment, was again subject to unpopular opinion, as 
they tightened monetary policy in order to control inflationary pressures. Inflation had 
spiked from 5.8% to 12.5% from September 2001 to August 2002. Mboweni (2002), 
stated; ‘In the face of these inflationary forces, the SARB responded by tightening 
monetary policy. On each occasion, in January, March, June and September 2002, 
the Reserve Bank’s repurchase rate was raised by 1%, leading to corresponding 
increases in the interest rates charged by commercial banks and thus the rates at 
which corporates were able to borrow at. The banks’ prime overdraft rate for example 
rose from 13% at the beginning at the year to 17% at present. At that level, the public 
is clearly feeling the impact of monetary policy. Dishing out this medicine doesn’t 
make the Bank very popular’ (Mboweni 2002). 
The inflation outlook improved during 2003 and decreased to a rate within the target 
band as a result of sustained prudent monetary and fiscal policies. The Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC), therefore, decreased interest rates on four occasions in 
2004, and a 5.5% adjustment occurred. This aggressive action equated interest rates 
to levels last seen in the 1980s. This had a direct impact on the size of the bond 
market which decreased significantly from R40 billion in 2002 to R 30 billion at the 
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end of 2005. With the cost of borrowing declining, the bond market became an 
attractive tool for corporates to raise financing. (Mboweni, 2003 & 2005) 
Moving to 2006, the repo rate was increased marginally to control inflationary 
pressure, and an all-round positive sentiment toward the capital market and growth 
prospects in South Africa was felt. However, by July 2007 turmoil had hit the global 
financial market as the sub-prime bust led to tightening of liquidity and credit 
conditions. ‘A rising wave of risk aversion prompted by increasing foreclosures in the 
US sub-prime mortgage market resulted in an abrupt deterioration in global financial 
market conditions in August 2007. Rising foreclosures and delinquencies were linked 
to sub-prime borrowers who had taken out adjustable rate mortgages. As interest 
rates reset to higher levels, in line with the rising US interest rate environment, these 
borrowers found it difficult to pay their mortgage loans. This turbulence was not 
confined to the US sub-prime market, spreading to the broader mortgage market and 
financial markets more generally.’ (Mboweni, 2007) 
South Africa, to a certain extent, was hedged against the effects of the crisis because 
of the dynamic relationship between gold and the stock market. An analysis was 
conducted by Chkili (2016), to determine the correlation between the two assets, gold 
and equity and the effectiveness of gold as a hedge in equity markets. The findings of 
this study indicated; the correlation between gold and equity markets is negative in 
periods of market turmoil or financial crises, therefore implying that gold can act as a 
safe haven against significant market movements. Further, adding gold to a stock 
portfolio enhances its risk adjusted return. Gold therefore, has both hedging and 
stabilizing characteristics. It was at this point, during the crisis, that Gold and Platinum 
companies represented more than 40% of the JSE Top 40 Index. These resource 
giants included BHP Billiton and Anglo American at 16% and 11.4% of the Top 40 
Index, respectively and energy company Sasol at 7.5%, to name a few. 
The study suggested an optimal allocation for gold in a South African asset portfolio, 
namely, in a one-dollar gold/stock portfolio 68.56%, should be invested in gold, 
whereas only 31.44% should be invested in the equity market. This strategy would 
effectively hedge the country and minimize the impact of the financial turbulence 
experienced in the crisis. It was in the peak of the crisis, that South Africa’s Top 40 
Index, used as a proxy for the composition of the JSE had a 40%+ holding in gold and 
minerals, thus allowing the country to mitigate the effects of the crisis. (Chkili, 2016) 
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(Wasserman, 2019). The crisis, nonetheless, had become pervasive as contagion 
took hold in the UK, Australia and the Eurozone.  
As risk aversion increased, the yield on a US three-month Treasury bill dropped 2%. 
To cover funding needs, US banks hoarded cash and liquidity dried up, in addition 
banks were no longer able to raise funding. The explosive demand for liquidity had an 
immediate impact on the short term money market, which resulted in overnight 
interest rates to soar. As a means to provide relief the Fed lowered its target federal 
funds rates, allowing emerging markets to breathe. (Mboweni, 2007) 
South African monetary policy, had been tightened from June 2006 and 2008, 
resulting in an upward trajectory, the repurchase rate had been increased by an 
additional 5% to 12% and the prime overdraft rate moved to 15.5%. Throughout this 
period, however, the outlook for the International economy remained uncertain. The 
negative effects of the sub-prime crisis were worse than expected which resulted in 
continued turbulence in the financial markets. This sentiment continued into 2008 and 
2009. Although, there were signs of recovery in the SA economy, a full recovery 
remained dependent on the pace of global recovery. Inflation had moderated, 
however continued declining, the economy experienced minimal growth and many 
sectors contracted. Consequently, the repurchase rate, contrast to earlier years, 
moved into a downward trajectory. The rate was 11.5% at the end of 2008 and had 
declined to 7% by the end of 2009. 
 
2.5.3. A New Millennium – the second decade and the Euro Debt Crisis 
 
Unfortunately, a renewed positive economic outlook for South Africa was not a reality 
in the near future. A series of events, including external shocks, resulted in a 
continued weak economic environment and the repurchase rate was set between 5% 
and 7% for the remaining years up until 2016. In 2010 the World incurred various 
challenges; low growth persisted in the US, with continued quantitative easing, 
solvency fears were crippling countries in the Euro area as sovereign debt concerns 
reached their peak, as such the current environment of global low interest rates were 
prolonged. In 2011, Gill Marcus, the Governor of the SARB, made the following 
statement; ‘Since the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, there has 
been no meaningful progress to resolving the sovereign debt crisis that is engulfing 
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the Euro area, with the primary focus now on Italy and Greece. The interlinked nature 
of the debt crisis and concerns about the banking sector in Europe, coupled with the 
inability of the advanced economies to generate sustained growth, continues to weigh 
negatively on the global economic outlook. The heightened uncertainty has had 
implications for the pattern of global capital flows and exchange rates in emerging 
markets’ (Marcus, 2011). 
By 2012, the Global crisis remained unresolved, domestic growth outlook 
deteriorated, and the Eurozone crisis had perpetuated into a recession. Asia 
experienced declining growth rates and China and India were expected to experience 
weak growth, with the implications thereof impacting prospects for emerging markets, 
including South Africa. The repurchase rate remained at a low 5%. As the country 
entered into 2013 to 2014 the outlook remained challenging, inflation begun 
breaching the upper band and monetary policy was altered upward. This perpetuated 
into 2015, alongside a severe drought and electricity demands far in excess of 
Eskom’s capacity, resulting in food inflation and inflation moving upward. The 
repurchase rate was subsequently altered upward, again. 
As the capital markets entered late 2016, positive sentiment appeared to return. 
Inflation was forecast to return to its target range and economic growth was expected 
to recover. The repurchase rate, nevertheless, was increased again in 2016, further to 
this long bond yields increased by 60 basis points during the year and subsequently 
moderated at 25 basis points higher than in 2015. Tighter monetary policy was also 
expected in the US, as uncertain conditions, including BREXIT, tariff increases on 
Chinese exports and the possibility of new US policy as a result of the current 
elections, were set to have adverse effects on the economy going forward. The 
Global Financial crisis of the late 2000s, seemingly behind the World and South 
Africa, had created global shock which caused an increase in the cost of debt 
financing. The interest rate hiking cycle, however, was set to end, although the 
Monetary Policy committee remained hesitant. (Marcus, 2012 & 2013; Kganyago, 
2014, 2015 & 2016A & B) 
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2.6 South African Debt Market 
 
While interest rates have played a huge role in the behaviour of corporates, an 
important aspect of the economy is its capital market. Capital markets have said to be 
imperative in economic development by providing liquidity to corporates to finance 
longer-term projects. Capital markets have three components, long term bank loans 
and deposits, bonds and equity capital. Each component serving a unique purpose in 
the market. Bonds are well suited to longer term financing needs, while bank debt has 
often been labelled ‘bridging finance’. In order to effectively obtain debt financing firms 
with favourable credit ratings will be subject to less capital market friction, as such 
equity is a valuable component, allowing firms to maintain sound capital structures 
and credit ratings.  
 
2.6.1. The Bond Exchange of South Africa – the Beginning 
 
The Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) is South Africa’s bond market, it is 
formalised, exchange driven, and exhibits characteristics of efficiency and liquidity. 
Government sanctions in the 1980s and early 1990s, had resulted in limited access to 
foreign lending and thus liquidity. As a result, South Africa relied heavily on the 
efficiency and liquidity provided by the bond market. The SA bond market had taken 
steps to become more formal as improvements to the functioning and efficiency 
thereof took place in 1990. Furthermore, the Bond Market Association was 
established in the mid-1980s allowing for its rapid development. (Mboweni, 2006C) 
In the years leading up to 1999, the following statistics were presented by the 
Governor of the South African Reserve Bank: 
‘The increase in total turnover in the secondary market for bonds was spectacular. 
The total value of transactions in secondary trading on the BESA increased from just 
over R2 trillion in 1995 to R4.3 trillion in 1997, and R8.5 trillion in 1998’ (Stals, 1999). 
This increase in participation in the capital market, and more specifically the debt 
market in 1998 was a result of further enhancements and greater flexibility regarding 
the payment, clearing and settling of transactions. Furthermore, exchange controls 
were lifted by policy makers in order to facilitate trade. This increase in activity in the 
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capital market included active participation from non-residents who were attracted by 
the aforementioned policy reforms. Although participation in the capital markets were 
positive, the adverse global financial conditions resulted in a depletion of foreign 
investment in the debt market by the end of 1998; net disinvestments from the BESA 
in 1998 were R10 billion, in the first four months of 1998 non-residents increased 
South African bond holdings by R16 billion, the months that followed saw non-
residents reduce their investments in bonds by R26 billion. This had severe 
repercussions for interest rates. (Stals, 1999) 
This trend continued into 2000, as non-residents became net sellers of bonds totalling 
R16.5 billion in the first 6 months of 2000. Non-residents were shifting their portfolios 
toward high-technology and manufacturing orientated economies instead of 
commodity-based countries. Inflows of other capital were able to temporarily mitigate 
the effects thereof. In mid-2000, the US dollar weakened on international foreign 
exchange markets and foreign investors returned to a net-purchasing position in the 
SA bond market. 
Toward the end of 2002, the governor of the Reserve Bank stated; ‘South Africa’s 
financial markets are robust, liquid and well-developed’ (Mboweni, 2002). He further 
went on to contextualise the size of the SA bond market, indicating that the value of 
its turnover in a single month was approximately R1 trillion, an amount equal to South 
Africa’s annual gross domestic product. Non-residents were playing a key role in 
these markets and contributed sizably to net purchases, although selling and buying 
bonds in equal amounts. The bond market continued to expand and increased a 
considerable 200% to the end of 2005. SA had become an attractive debt market for 
foreign investment, as rating agencies Fitch and Standard and Poor’s had improved 
their investment rating of the country, which moved from ‘high risk speculative grade’ 
in 1994 to ‘investment grade rating’ in 2005. Foreign investors continued to actively 
participate in the bond market, with foreign flows accounting for 18.9% of total bond 
market flows in 2005, up from 9% a year earlier. (Mboweni, 2002, 2003 & 2005) 
Foreign investors remained net purchases in the South African bond market during 
2006 as their interest in the South African market remained strong, it became evident 
that emerging markets were becoming more resilient to exogenous shocks impacting 
investor sentiment, such as the East Asian Crisis of 1997-1998. Investors, regardless, 
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continued to seek high yielding instruments. ‘In 2005, a total net amount of R23.8 
billion was raised through the primary issuance of bonds on BESA’ (Mboweni, 2006). 
In 2005 the total value of bonds listed on the BESA was equivalent to 46% of gross 
domestic product. This consisted of 70 different issuers of bonds, including public 
firms. The BESA, at this stage had good liquidity as measured by total transactions 
and turnover. Significant contributions were made by non-residents.  
A downside, however, to the efficacy of the BESA was crowding out, a circumstance 
in which issuing of domestic debt crowds out private sector issuers of debt securities, 
resulting in an adverse impact on long term productive investment in the economy. 
This was prevalent in South Africa given the government budget deficit, the deficit as 
2.3% and 3.1% of total SA GDP for the years 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 respectively, 
was mostly financed through domestic borrowing i.e. issuing of government bonds. 
Under these circumstances an increased issuing of government bonds results in a 
decline in bond prices and inversely, higher domestic interest rates. Higher domestic 
interest rates increase the cost of issuing debt, and in turn could result in a crowding 
out of private investment. Kahn, indicated, in his 2005 paper on Bond Market 
Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, that developments in the SA domestic bond 
market had only, more recently, included the significant expansion of the domestic 
private bond market. (Kahn, 2005; Treasury, 2005)  
By 2006, a promising finding indicated, that while government bonds still accounted 
for much of the debt listed on the BESA at 66%, this had declined from 80% in 1996, 
thus indicating an increase in bond activity by corporates. At this point, new issuances 
of corporate bonds had overtaken those of government. Bonds were enjoying an 
extended rally and yields had reached record lows toward the end of the year. Tighter 
monetary policy, as discussed above, however, increased bond yields, combined with 
asset repricing as a result of perceived emerging market risk by foreign investors. 
(Mboweni, 2006C & 2007)  
As the economy moved into 2007, the landscape was characterised by US sub-prime 
crisis. SA, however, was somewhat unaffected at this point, the banking sector had 
minimal exposure to the US sub-prime market and liquidity remained healthy. Non-
residents interest in the bond market remained positive. (Mboweni, 2007) 
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2.6.2. The Bond Exchange of South Africa – a Global Player 
 
Fast forward to late 2009; the BESA became a wholly owned subsidiary of the JSE 
and was commended for playing an imperative role in advancing SA as a leader in 
emerging markets and a global player in the bond market. Being both well developed 
and liquid, the bond exchange was placed fourth in the World Federation of 
Exchanges based on turnover recorded for bond trades in 2008. This was positive for 
various reasons; a well-functioning bond market could improve the transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy and provide insights to the reserve bank on the 
inflation and interest rate expectations of market participants, pricing of debt is 
considered more effective, and a bond market reduces the concentration of credit 
risk, which would solely lie with banking institutions. These attributes and the gold 
hedge allowed South Africa to fare well during the global financial crisis as it provided 
financial stability. 
The bond market, however, did not come out unscathed from the crisis. The 
contraction in economic activity and easing of monetary policy had the following 
effects; downward pressure on bond yields and increased risk aversion, which in turn 
resulted in non-residents reducing their exposure to the domestic bond market. Bond 
listings, however, still grew within 2008, albeit at a slower pace given corporates were 
forced to downscale as a result of a slowdown in economic activity. (Mminele, 2009) 
Following the crisis, global uncertainty remained at the forefront of the World 
economy and prospects in emerging markets, while positive remained challenging. In 
2012 the BESA was included in the World Government Bond Index of Citibank, which 
resulted in an influx of inflows into the domestic bond market. This inflow assisted in 
moderating the degree of depreciation that the exchange had experienced. Non-
residents contributed a total of R85.2 billion in net purchases of bonds in 2012. The 
bond market fared well relative to the equity market in which non-residents were net-
sellers at this point. By 2014, US quantitative easing was underway, and the US 
policy rate remained zero bound, non-resident activity in the SA market was buoyant. 
Market sentiment had resulted in an initial sell off of bonds, resulting in net-sales in 
May 2013, however as expectations of US Fed tapering were modified, non-residents 
resumed a net-purchasing position of R17 billion thus reversing the net sales, by 
October 2013.  
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This was temporary, as risk aversion increased in November and net-sales of bonds 
amounted to R9.7 billion. Overall non-resident purchases of bonds amounted to 
R12.8 billion. (Marcus, 2013) 
This trend persisted into the coming years, in 2014 non-residents remained net-
sellers in the bond market, at November net bond sales amounted to R16.2 billion. 
US quantitative easing continued and the volatility in capital flows were indicative of 
fickle global investor sentiment. This perpetuated into 2016 and SA experienced a 
significant sale of bonds by non-residents of R42.7 billion. The US presidential 
elections had caused uncertainty, and economic policies, to curb higher inflation, 
indicated a possibility of increased tightening of US monetary policy. Coupled with a 
sharp increase in US long yields, the reversal of capital flows to emerging markets, 
including SA was to be expected. (Kganyago, 2014 & 2016B) 
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2.7. Conclusion  
 
Dominant theories, such as the irrelevance theory, trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory and agency theory, have been the foundation to which the determinants of 
capital structure have been established. Traditional and commonly used determinants 
have been identified as; firm size, asset tangibility, and firm profitability and growth 
opportunities. Their ability to predict changes in firm capital structure is varied.  
Significant findings from this literature review have indicated the following; regression 
results differ significantly dependant on the leverage measure and the sector 
examined. Further the findings of Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et all., (2015), likewise 
indicate that a firm’s capital structure varies significantly across economic activity of 
firms. Thus, the results of this study are likely to be varied based on the sector and 
leverage measures used. (Noulas & Genimakis, 2011) 
Leverage and corporate performance were addressed and echoed the importance of 
decisions made by corporates regarding their capital structure. While alternative 
findings were presented, in aggregate, leverage had impacted corporate 
performance.  
The macro-economic review of South African interest rates and the capital market 
provided readers with insight regarding changes that had occurred across the period. 
Section 2.5 analysed each decade within the sample period and confirmed that South 
Africa was no stranger to the repercussion of World Economic shocks, of which 
resulted in fluctuating inflation and interest rates for the country. The Bond Exchange 
of South Africa was discussed in Section 2.6 and detailed the progression of the 
capital market through the years, and thus the accessibility of debt for corporates. 
The theory and macro-economic findings within this review will provide a basis to 
justify the capital structure decisions made by firms within the sample, specifically the 
increase in debt levels across the period and any marked inclines or declines.  
The investigation of these theories, the associated capital structure determinants and 
the relationship between leverage and performance will inform the methodology to 
which this paper analyses the change in corporate leverage in South Africa over the 
period of 1994 - 2016 using a sample of companies from the real estate and REIT, 
travel and leisure and construction and materials sectors listed on the JSE.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights the methodology used to analyse the change in corporate debt 
levels in South Africa between the periods of 1994 to 2016. The theoretical framework 
that formed part of the literature review is the basis from which the model and 
estimation is derived.  
The aim of the quantitative research is to determine whether;  
o Leverage within firm capital structure has changed for the period of 1994 to 2016, 
o There is a relationship between corporate leverage ratios and the determinants of 
capital structure, and 
o The relationship, if any, is able to significantly predict the changes in the level of 
leverage held in a firm’s capital structure. 
 
The relationship between the dependent variables, leverage ratios and independent 
variables, the capital structure determinants will take the following form;  
o General Equation;   Y = (µ1) (X1) + (µ2) (X2) + (µ3) (X3) + (µ4) (X4) + ... 
 
Where,  Y is the dependent variable, and 
   X is the independent variable  
 
o Specific Equation (defined in detail below);  
TDBV = (µ1)(SIZE) + (µ2) (TANG) + (µ3) (PROF) + (µ4) (GROW) + (µ5) (CORD) + (µ6) (TAX) 
 
TDMV = (µ1)(SIZE) + (µ2) (TANG) + (µ3) (PROF) + (µ4) (GROW) + (µ5) (CORD) + (µ6) (TAX) 
 
TLBV = (µ1) (SIZE) + (µ2) (TANG) + (µ3) (PROF) + (µ4) (GROW) + (µ5) (CORD) + (µ6 (TAX) 
 
TLMV = (µ1) (SIZE) + (µ2) (TANG) + (µ3) (PROF) + (µ4) (GROW) + (µ5) (CORD) + (µ6 (TAX) 
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3.2. Definition and Analysis of Variables 
 
3.2.1. Leverage Ratios – Dependent Variables  
 
Four alternative leverage ratios will be used in this study, these are the dependent 
variables. The leverage ratios are as follows; total debt over book value of equity, total 
debt over market value of equity, total liabilities over book value of equity and total 
liabilities over market value of equity. This is consistent with Slabbert (2018) and 
allows for ease of comparison of each of the studies that make up this research topic.  
Total debt will be defined as long and short term debt that is interest bearing. Interest 
bearing debt is associated with an increased risk of firm bankruptcy. Total liabilities 
will consist of both interest bearing borrowings (short and long) and other accounts, 
such as trade creditors, deferred tax and provisions. These are defined by the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The denominators of each of the 
leverage measures; book and market value of equity are defined as follows; equity 
per the firm’s statement of financial position, i.e. share capital at the value it was 
originally issued and the market capitalisation of the firm, which is the current value of 
issued equity, respectively. Table 5 highlights the leverage measures that will be 
used.  
 
Table 5: Leverage Measures 
Proxy Variable Calculation 
TDBV 
Total Debt to Book 
Value of Equity 
Long-term Interest Bearing Debt + Short-term 
Interest Bearing Debt / Total Book Value of Equity 
TDMV 
Total Debt to Market 
Value of Equity 
Long-term Interest Bearing Debt + Short-term 
Interest Bearing Debt / Total Market Value of Equity 
TLBV 
Total Liabilities to 
Book Value of Equity 
Total Liabilities / Total Book Value of Equity 
TLMV 
Total Liabilities to 
Market Value of Equity 
Total Liabilities / Total Market Value of Equity 
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3.2.2. Determinants of Capital Structure – Independent Variables  
 
This study will use the following capital structure determinants; firm size (calculated 
as the natural logarithm of firm revenue), tangibility of assets (fixed assets, also 
known as property, plant and equipment over total assets), profitability (earnings 
before interest and tax over total assets, growth (natural logarithm of total assets), 
cost of debt (prime interest rate in South Africa) and the corporate tax rate (tax rate in 
SA). 
Similar, to dependent variables, these are consistent with those used by Slabbert 
(2018) in order to ensure consistency and comparable results between the 4 authors 
who have been tasked with completing this study, across the JSE. 
These determinants and the method to calculate these have been summarised in the 
table below, Table 6. Each independent variable will be discussed in detail.  
 
Table 6: Capital Structure Determinants 
Proxy  Determinant Calculation 
SIZE Firm Size Natural logarithm of Turnover 
TANG Tangibility of Assets Fixed Assets / Total Assets 
PROF Profitability 
Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) / Total 
Assets 
GROW Growth Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
CORD Cost of Debt South African Prime Rate 
TAX Tax Rate South African Corporate Tax Rate 
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3.2.2.1. Firm Size 
 
Firm size will be calculated as the natural logarithm of firm revenue. The majority of 
research support the notion that larger firms have greater debt capacity. These 
studies indicate that larger firms are better diversified and have lower probabilities of 
default and thus financial distress. Larger firms are also assumed to have stable 
future cash flows. Further to this, larger firms have easier access to debt, incur lower 
transactions costs associated with debt and therefore find it less expensive to issue 
long term debt. As a result, and in support of the trade-off theory, a positive 
relationship between leverage and firm size is expected.  
The pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship, indicating that, larger firms 
have fewer information asymmetries as a result of better quality financial information, 
therefore the cost of issuing equity is lower. Agency theory, however, suggests 
neither a positive or negative relationship, as this would depend on firm and 
management specific circumstances. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Smith, 2010; Sbeti & 
Moosa, 2012; Harrison, et al., 2011; Noulas & Genimakis, 2011) 
 
3.2.2.2 Asset Tangibility  
 
Asset tangibility will be measured as the ratio of tangible assets, also known as 
property, plant and equipment over total assets and offers a similar argument to firm 
size. The pecking order theory indicates that increased tangible assets will result in 
fewer information asymmetries, allowing firms to issue equity without being penalised 
by the market, thus a negative relationship will exist. The trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relationship; tangible assets serve as effective collateral for lenders, if a 
borrower defaults due to financial distress, therefore increasing the amount and ease 
at which these firms can obtain debt. Tangible assets may also allow firms to obtain 
favourable debt financing terms. The latter relationship forming the consensus 
amongst the studies presented in the literature review, Chapter 2. 
The following has been noted in the travel sector; ‘most hotel assets are tangible and 
represent valuable collateral, therefore it may be very likely that the type of 
investments made by lodging companies are better financed with long term debt as 
lenders are more comfortable with real estate type investments and debt capital 
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works better to control any associated agency problems (Karadeniz, et al., 2009).’ In 
support, Smith (2010), stated; tangible assets can mitigate concerns over insider 
resource exploitation as described by agency costs. This will have relevance to the 
real estate and REIT sector. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Smith, 2010; Harrison, et al., 
2011) 
 
3.2.2.3 Profitability  
 
Profitability will be measured as a firm’s earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) over 
total assets, i.e. return on assets. Profitability, similar to firm size and tangibility will 
increase the firm’s borrowing capacity. Smith (2010), Harrison, et al. (2011) and 
Noulas et al. (2011) indicate that profitability has an inverse relationship with financial 
distress, thus lowering the risk of bankruptcy and increasing the firm’s ability borrow 
and potentially obtain financing on favourable terms. Further, firms enjoying higher 
profits will require a greater tax shield, thus taking on greater amounts of leverage. 
Pecking order theory suggests the opposite; leverage and profitability are negatively 
related. Firms are likely to use less debt with an increased availability of internal 
funds. Similar, an increase in profitability will allow risk averse managers the 
opportunity to avoid debt in their capital structure. Harrison, et al. (2011), argues that 
profitability lowers debt ratios mainly through the retention of earnings and a negative 
relationship is to be expected. The findings within these studies, convincingly support 
the pecking order theory. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Smith, 2010; Harrison, et al., 2011) 
 
3.2.3.4. Growth  
 
Firm growth will be calculated using the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  
This measurement basis differs to past studies, in which a market based measures 
have been used, namely; the firm’s market to book ratio. This ratio accounts for the 
market’s perception of the firm, potentially distorting results, thus an alternative 
accounting measure has been used.  
Dissimilar to the determinants discussed above and contradictory to initial belief, the 
hypothesised relationship between growth and leverage is negative. Although growth 
opportunities may result in an increase in future profitability, it is also associated with 
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an increase in risk. Growth opportunities bear more risk and thus higher financial 
distress costs. The trade-off theory, therefore, suggests that there is an expected 
negative relationship. Furthermore, high growth firms will finance growth with equity 
finance to mitigate idle capacity problems arising from risky debt. Harrison, et al. 
(2011), in support of this notion predicts that ‘corporate borrowing introduces 
deadweight costs into the firm’s decision making process and as such high growth 
firms wishing to avoid this may lower their use of debt.’ (Karadeniz, et al., 2009) 
Smith (2010), describes a positive relationship between debt and growth, in terms of 
the pecking order theory, and suggests that it is likely that high growth firms will use 
greater portions of debt financing as they are unable to fund all investment 
opportunities with internal sources. The results of studies discussed in the literature 
review, again, are convincingly in support of the pecking order theory. 
 
3.2.2.5. Cost of Debt 
 
This study will use the South African prime interest rate as a proxy for the cost of 
debt. The South African prime interest rate is a function of the repurchase rate, a rate 
at which banks are able to borrow from the SARB. The prime rate is greater than the 
repurchase rate and is used as a basis to determine rates at which commercial banks 
will lend to their customers, after accounting for client specific risk factors. Interest 
rates, including the prime rate have fallen significantly since the highs experienced in 
1980, impacting a firm’s capital structure decision making. (Correia, Flynn, Uliana & 
Wormald, 2011)  
Although, not commonly been used in past studies, it is suggested, per the trade-off 
theory, that an increase in the cost of debt, may increase the cost of financial distress 
and as such an inverse relationship would be expected.  
A study conducted by Kumar and Bodla (2014), looking at the corporate capital 
structure in developing countries such as India, included the cost of borrowing as a 
determinant for leverage. The study supported the inverse relationship; an increase in 
the cost of borrowing, is likely to reduce a firm’s dependence on borrowed funds.  
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A second study investigating the relationship between the cost of debt and leverage 
by Harrison, et al., 2011, also found a negative relationship in support of the trade-off 
theory. (Kumar & Bodla, 2014) 
 
3.2.2.6. Corporate Tax Rate  
 
The South African corporate tax rate will be used to measure the corporate tax rate. 
In 2011, Correia noted the following; ‘South Africa has undertaken major changes to 
the tax system which are impacting on investment and financing decisions. The 
significant reduction in the corporate tax rate from 48% to 28% in the last 20 years 
has affected corporate investment and financing decisions’ (Correia, et al., 2011). 
Few studies have incorporated the tax rate as a predictor into their model, however, 
their basis for inclusion is a result of the following; trade-off theory of capital structure 
rests on the premise that interest expense on debt is deductible for tax purposes. 
Therefore, considering this theory, there should be a positive relationship between the 
corporate tax rate and debt ratios. In other words, higher corporate tax rates should 
have a positive effect on the value of tax shields, resulting in increased debt holdings. 
The pecking order theory, however, does not specify a relationship between tax rates 
and debt. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009; Oztekin, 2015) 
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3.3. Data Sources 
 
Data used to calculate the applicable ratios, which are used for both the dependent 
and independent variables to complete the regression were obtained from annual 
financial statements extracted from Iress. The sample period was set from 1994 to 
2016, or from the period in which the firm became publically listed. In the event that a 
firm had limited financial information or had been suspended from their listing, they 
were removed from the sample. Thus, having a total sample of 76 firms across the 
following three sectors: real estate sector including real estate investment trusts and 
real estate investments and services, travel and leisure sector and the construction 
and materials Sector. The entire sample is contained in Appendix A-1.  
The corporate tax rate is readily available and the cost of debt, is the South African 
prime rate, which has been obtained from Iress. Data analysis was completed using 
Microsoft Excel. 
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3.4. Estimation Techniques  
 
Having defined the objective, described the dependent and independent variables, 
and sourced the appropriate data, this section will provide readers with insight into the 
method used to conduct the trend analysis, correlation and regression analysis.  
The first objective is to determine whether firm leverage has changed across the 
period, this will be completed using graphical representations to determine trends. 
The second objective is to determine whether a relationship exists between the 
dependent and independent variables, the correlation coefficient. This value will 
determine whether the variables are negatively or positively related to one another, as 
indicated by a negative or a positive value respectively. A perfect negative correlation 
would be represented by -1 and a perfect positive correlation by +1. No correlation 
returns a zero value. This has been performed in Excel using Excel Data Analysis 
Toolpak. 
This tool generates a correlation coefficient matrix, from which, it can be determined 
whether the leverage ratio is positively or negatively related to each of the capital 
structure determinants. However, to determine whether the correlation coefficient is 
real and not a result of a chance occurrence, a significance test, calculating 
associated p-values, will be completed. A correlation coefficient is said to be 
statistically significant when the associated p-value is less than 0.05 or 0.01, with the 
latter indicating greater statistical significance. A p-value in excess of 0.05 will not 
allow us to conclude that the result is real and not as a result of chance or luck. 
The p-value will be determined using a regression model, this model will be run using 
the Excel Data Analysis Toolpak. This tool assumes a t-distribution, in which the 
mean is calculated under the assumption of a normal distribution, while the standard 
deviation is unknown. A separate regression will be run for each of the leverage 
ratios; TDMV, TDBV, TLMV, TLBV. The leverage ratio is input into the model as the 
dependent variable and each of the capital structure determinants; SIZE, TANG, 
PROF, GROW, CORD and TAX are input as the independent variables, also known 
as the predictors or X-values.  The results of each regression will calculate a p-value 
that corresponds to that leverage ratio, for example TDMV and each of the capital 
structure determinants. The results will provide an indication of whether the capital 
structure determinants are statistically significantly correlated to that leverage ratio. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Having determined the methodology in which this research will be conducted. This 
chapter seeks to document the results from the quantitative research performed over 
the capital structure determinants of leverage in South Africa for the period 1994 to 
2016, for real estate, REITs, travel and leisure and construction and materials firms 
across the JSE.  
A trend analysis will be performed to address the overall changes in leverage for the 
period and the use of different types of leverage, for example short term and long 
term debt relative to total debt and current and non-current liabilities to total liabilities. 
This will be performed for each of the sectors and the total sample. 
The following estimation techniques will be used; a correlation coefficient analysis, in 
order to determine whether the determinants are positively or negatively correlated to 
leverage, and a regression technique in which the significance between the leverage 
ratio, dependent variable and the independent capital structure determinants will be 
determined. This will be determined using the p-values of the regression analysis. 
The correlation matrix and regression analysis will be performed consistently over the 
total sample, and each of the sectors individually. Further, a regression model will be 
used for each of the leverage ratios, within the total sample and individual sectors, 
namely; TDMV, TDBV, TLMV and TLBV. Thus, the results will conclude on the 
statistical significance of the relationships between each of the leverage ratios and the 
determinants of size, tangibility, profitability, growth, cost of debt and tax, for the total 
sample, real estate and REITs, travel and leisure and construction and material firms.  
The trend analysis will be completed using graphs to highlight the use of and changes 
in debt, while the estimation techniques will be completed using the Microsoft Excel 
Analysis Toolpak. These will be documented in Section 1 and Section 2 – Trend 
Analysis and Section 3 – Regression Analysis for the Total Sample and each sector, 
respectively. 
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4.2. Total Sample 
 
4.2.1. Total Sample – Leverage Results 
 
Figure 1: Leverage Ratios for the Total Sample 
 
 
Figure 2: JSE All Share Index (ALSI) – Price Performance for the period 1995 – 2016 
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The total sample consisted of 76 firms listed on the JSE, in the real estate and REIT, 
travel and leisure and construction and materials sectors. Figure 1 provides a 
graphical representation of the different leverage ratios for the Total Sample, for 
period 1994 to 2016. Figure 2 is the performance of the JSE All Share Index for the 
period 1995 to 2016. The benchmark 10-year government bond rate is displayed, for 
the period 2003 to 2016, in Figure 3.  
Inspecting Figure 1, a significant upward trend in leverage begun in 2001, peaking at 
an all-time high in 2007 and declining sharply in 2008. In 2004, we confirm the definite 
upward trend in leverage. This increase in debt usage is explained as follows; in 
2004, extremely low interest rates attracted government and corporates to issue debt 
financing. Debt, cheaper than previous years, had become an attractive tool in the 
capital market. In 2006, evidence indicated that corporates had increased their activity 
on the BESA. The numerator of each ratio, i.e. debt and or liabilities, had increased. 
 
Figure 3: Republic of South Africa – R186 – 10 Year Government bond rate 
 
 
A second factor contributing to the changes in leverage, specifically influencing the 
denominator – equity, was the Global Financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. While, South 
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performance of the JSE All Share Index from 1995 to 2016, a significant and sharp 
decline in the index occurred between 2007 and 2008. This, sharp decline, coincides 
with the all-time high in leverage ratios seen in 2007. As the market value of equity 
stocks declined sharply (the denominator in the leverage ratios, TDMV and TLMV), 
the debt to equity ratio spiked significantly. The crisis, and subsequent decline in 
equity, had the effect of changing the weight of debt and equity within firms’ capital 
structures and thus their risk profile. (Mminele, 2009) 
After the 2007 high, leverage declined sharply, as a result of the following; between 
years 2006 to 2008, interest rates were increased by the SARB, thus debt became 
expensive to issue and leverage became less attractive to corporates. As seen in 
Figure 2 the 10-year government bond rate increases steadily from 2006 until 2010.  
Further as equity markets recovered, the market value of stock would have increased 
in value, thus decreasing the leverage ratio. Corporates, would have, amidst the 
crisis, paid down their debt to stabilise their debt-equity ratios, thus further 
contributing to the decline in leverage ratios as seen in Figure 1, post 2008. 
Following this, between the years; 2011 and 2014, debt measures spike and fall on a 
second occasion, peaking at a second high in 2013. Explaining this spike; leverage, 
as seen in Figure 3, had become increasing cheaper, beginning in 2011 the 10-year 
government bond rate can be seen decreasing from roughly 7.7% to a low of 6.6% in 
2013. The South African repurchase rate, driving the decline in rates was at a low of 
5% at the end of 2012, once again making debt cheaper and attractive to corporates. 
After which, however, rates begun increasing as monetary policy was altered to curb 
inflation and as a result leverage begun decreasing, again it was considered an 
expensive source of finance. (Mboweni, 2003, 2004 & 2005) 
Overall, the South African capital market deepened from 1994 to 2016, increased 
efficiency and the establishment and improvements the BESA, meant debt financing 
became both readily available and cheaper relative to the high interest rates seen in 
the late 1980s, allowing firms to increase debt, relative to equity in their capital 
structure. Favourable monetary policy made debt an attractive tool to raise finance. 
The numerical analysis of each leverage ratio, for the period 1994 to 2016 is 
summarised in Table 7 and Appendix A-3. Individual leverage graphs, for TDBV, 
TDMV, TLBV and TLMV can be seen in Appendix A-4. 
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Table 7: Yearly Leverage for the Total Sample 
Total Sample 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 366% 427% 25% 68% 
1995 407% 481% 15% 46% 
1996 104% 176% 16% 55% 
1997 124% 198% 24% 73% 
1998 77% 146% 34% 114% 
1999 56% 163% 18% 72% 
2000 94% 137% 22% 56% 
2001 79% 120% 23% 53% 
2002 908% 1007% 29% 61% 
2003 716% 1365% 31% 63% 
2004 1082% 1232% 29% 48% 
2005 1602% 1838% 27% 46% 
2006 2059% 2392% 52% 74% 
2007 2982% 3181% 46% 64% 
2008 260% 367% 69% 101% 
2009 322% 407% 68% 103% 
2010 298% 373% 60% 94% 
2011 292% 355% 74% 106% 
2012 1019% 1124% 62% 90% 
2013 2174% 2331% 63% 86% 
2014 99% 134% 48% 67% 
2015 67% 89% 50% 66% 
2016 71% 98% 56% 72% 
          
Average 663% 789% 41% 73% 
Min  56% 89% 15% 46% 
Max 2982% 3181% 74% 114% 
Std Dev 814% 883% 19% 20% 
Range 2926% 3092% 59% 68% 
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4.2.2. Total Sample – Term Structure of Leverage 
 
Figure 4: Long term and Short term Debt relative to Total Debt and Long term and 
Short term Liabilities relative to Total Liabilities 
 
 
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the preferred term structure of debt.  
Looking at the preferred term structure of debt, as graphically displayed in Figure 4, 
holdings of long term debt were consistently larger than those of short term debt.  
In greater detail; current liabilities appear to have been favoured relative to non-
current liabilities, for years 1994 to 1998, subsequently, non-current liabilities were 
considerably larger than current. Both measures, however converged in 1996, and 
again, albeit less aggressively in 2008. In other words, the use of short term debt and 
liabilities were preferred relative to long term. Corroborating these findings, Chapter 2 
describes the following; from 1994 to 1996, Apartheid government sanctions, little 
foreign investment and low government savings had resulted in a shortage of funding 
and high demand for shorts term funds. As a result, short term interest rates 
increased from 10% in 1994 to 16% in early 1996, whereas long term government 
yields declined. It is from this point, in which firms shifted back into long term debt 
financing, as short term debt was associated with high interest rates. (Stals, 1996B)  
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4.2.3. Total Sample – Correlation & Significance Results 
 
The correlation analysis has been documented in a correlation matrix in Table 8, 
while the regression models, per leverage ratio have been summarised in Table 9, the 
results of the correlation and significance analysis are summarised below. Statistical 
significance has been documented at the 5% and 1% levels. The results are as 
follow; 
o Firm size (SIZE) is positively correlated to each of the leverage ratios with the 
following displaying statistical significance; TDMV and TLMV at the 0.01 level. 
These ratios incorporate the market measure of equity and as such market 
perception toward firm size may drive this relationship.  
 
o Tangibility (TANG) and profitability (PROF) are positively correlated to both TDBV 
and TLBV and negatively correlated to TDMV and TLMV. Tangibility displays no 
statistical significance, while profitability reflects significant correlation at the 0.01 
level for TDBV, TLBV and TDMV and at the 0.05 level for TLMV. 
 
o Growth (GROW) is positively correlated to each of the leverage ratios, in addition 
significant correlation exists with TDMV at the 0.01 level and TLMV at the 0.05 
level. These ratios incorporate market perception toward the firm (reflected in the 
market capitalisation). Similar to firm size, market perception toward growth may 
impact the share price resulting in a significant relationship between leverage and 
growth.  
 
o The cost of debt (CORD), as measured by the South African prime interest rate is 
negatively related to each of the leverage ratios, with TDMV showing statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level.  
 
o Corporate tax rate (TAX) is negatively correlated to each of the leverage 
measures, with significance of TDMV at the 0.01 level.  
The capital structure determinants showed the greatest statistical significance toward 
TDMV, in other words the capital structure determinants were best able to predict the 
variability in total debt to market value of equity. Poor predictability was found 
between the capital structure determinants and TDBV and TLBV. In agreement, there 
is not a good fit in the regression model as measured by adjusted R2, when using 
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TDBV and TLBV as our leverage measures. Whereas adjusted R2, for model TDMV 
and TDLV, indicated that there was a reasonable fit. Further, profitability displayed 
significant correlation toward each of the leverage ratios, while tangibility the least. 
The relationship between leverage and determinants; size, tangibility, profitability and 
the cost of debt, support the trade-off theory, whereas the positive relationship 
between growth and leverage, consistent with much of the past literature, supports 
the pecking order theory. The relationship between the tax rate and leverage support 
neither theory. For the total sample, the findings broadly support the trade-off theory.  
Table 8, 9 and 10 below provide a summary of the following; correlation between the 
four leverage ratios and 6 capital structure determinants, the regression model for 
each of the leverage ratios and the descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Table 8: Correlation between dependent variable & determinants for the Total Sample  
Correlation - Total Sample 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV SIZE TANG PROF GROW CORD TAX 
TDBV 1.0 0.991 0.177 -0.138 0.228 0.033 0.568 0.225 -0.233 -0.226 
TLBV 0.991 1.0 0.156 -0.151 0.190 0.190 0.558 0.195 -0.237 -0.221 
TDMV 0.177 0.156 1.0 0.156 0.745 0.745 -0.069 0.843 -0.634 -0.742 
TLMV -0.138 -0.151 0.156 1.0 0.473 0.473 -0.168 0.383 -0.087 -0.421 
SIZE  0.228 0.190 0.745 0.473 1.0 -0.178 0.328 0.707 -0.301 -0.266 
TANG 0.033 0.104 -0.061 -0.343 -0.178 1.0 -0.033 0.058 -0.273 -0.156 
PROF 0.568 0.558 -0.069 -0.168 0.328 -0.033 1.0 -0.072 0.081 0.211 
GROW 0.225 0.195 0.843 0.383 0.707 0.058 -0.072 1.0 -0.736 -0.772 
CORD -0.233 -0.237 -0.634 -0.087 -0.301 -0.273 0.081 -0.736 1.0 0.725 
TAX -0.226 -0.221 -0.742 -0.421 -0.266 -0.156 0.211 -0.772 0.725 1.0 
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Table 9: Regression Statistics for the Total Sample 
 
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate 
 
1 0.687899 0.473205 0.275657 692.41%  
           
      
Anova 
     
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 689.057030 6 114.842838 2.395392 0.076196 
Residual  767.091752 16 47.943234    
Total  1456.148782 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDBV (constant) 13.963945 71.098365 0.19640 0.84677 
SIZE   -3.881364 4.738467 -0.81912 0.42475 
TANG   -0.022480 0.083028 -0.27075 0.79005 
PROF   154.001287 46.693135 3.29816 0.00454 
GROW   3.237279 5.284816 0.61256 0.54877 
CORD   2.603919 62.710902 0.04152 0.96739 
TAX   -64.278869 119.614285 -0.53738 0.59840 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV  
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.676711 0.457938 0.254664 762.63%  
           
      
Anova 
     
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 786.143683 6 131.023947 2.252815 0.091036 
Residual  930.561469 16 58.160092    
Total  1716.705153 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLBV (constant) 29.478202 78.308425 0.376437 0.711537 
SIZE   -3.608590 5.218994 -0.691434 0.499203 
TANG   0.008381 0.091448 0.091651 0.928113 
PROF   162.162414 51.428269 3.153177 0.006154 
GROW   2.396849 5.820748 0.411777 0.685967 
CORD   -3.320666 69.070393 -0.048077 0.962250 
TAX   -83.212451 131.744327 -0.631621 0.536555 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.968120 0.937256 0.913726 5.65%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 0.761798 6 0.126966 39.833792 0.000000 
Residual  0.050998 16 0.003187    
Total  0.812797 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients      
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLBV (constant) 0.574335 0.579715 0.990720 0.336570 
SIZE   0.265890 0.038636 6.881924 0.000004 
TANG   -0.000394 0.000677 -0.581492 0.569012 
PROF   -1.328158 0.380722 -3.488526 0.003036 
GROW   -0.128349 0.043091 -2.978577 0.008867 
CORD   -1.237871 0.511326 -2.420903 0.027740 
TAX   -5.546134 0.975299 -5.686597 0.000034 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.826881 0.683732 0.565132 13.18%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 0.601024 6 0.100171 5.765003 0.002332 
Residual  0.278010 16 0.017376    
Total  0.879034 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients      
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLMV (constant) 2.691407 1.353526 1.988442 0.064148 
SIZE   0.321393 0.090208 3.562806 0.002595 
TANG   -0.002114 0.001581 -1.337347 0.199812 
PROF   -2.172557 0.888914 -2.444057 0.026486 
GROW   -0.244311 0.100609 -2.428324 0.027332 
CORD   0.724788 1.193850 0.607102 0.552302 
TAX   -8.522501 2.277141 -3.742632 0.001775 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Total Sample 
Descriptive Statistics - Total Sample 
  N Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  
TDBV 23 55.94% 2981.70% 663.48% 813.56% 
TLBV 23 89.13% 3181.13% 788.66% 883.36% 
TDMV 23 15.04% 74.16% 40.92% 19.22% 
TLMV 23 46.00% 114.06% 72.98% 19.99% 
SIZE 23                13.07                 15.42                 14.49                   0.73  
TANG 23 239% 7454% 2223% 1945% 
PROF 23 3.10% 19.64% 11.01% 3.96% 
GROW 23                14.50                 17.40                 15.87                   0.97  
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N 23        
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4.3. Real Estate Investments and REITs 
 
4.3.1. Real Estate Investments and REITs – Leverage Results 
 
Figure 5: Leverage Ratios for the Real Estate and REIT Sector 
 
 
Figure 6: JSE Listed Properties Index – Price Performance for the period 2004 – 2016 
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REITs and real estate firms within this study account for a total of 47 firms and 61.8% 
of the total sample. REITs make an interesting analysis as their tax liability is limited.  
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the different leverage ratios for the 
real estate and REIT sector, for period 1994 to 2016. Figure 6 is the performance of 
the JSE Listed Properties Index for the period 1995 to 2016.  
Looking at the trend analysis, overall debt holdings decreased for this sector, the year 
on year trend, however, mimicked that of the total sample, and as such follow the 
same rationale presented for the total sample. As seen in Figure 5, leverage ratios 
spike in years’ 2007 and 2013. Similar to the performance of the ALSI, the 
performance of the JSE Listed Properties Index as seen in Figure 6, falls between 
years 2007 and 2008, thus reducing the denominator in each of the market leverage 
ratios and causing a large peak in the leverage ratios. Further, low interest rates of 
2004 to 2006, would have encouraged corporates to issue debt and therefore 
contributed to the steady increase in leverage ratios seen between 2004 and 2007. 
Debt levels declined sharply between 2007 and 2008, as corporates would have paid 
down debt to stabilise leverage ratios and tighter monetary policy ensued, making 
debt relatively more expensive.  
Leverage increased for a second time in 2013 as the SARB reduced the repurchase 
rate, in turn bond yields declined and corporates favoured debt as a cheaper source 
of finance. Decreasing interest rates can be seen in 4.2.1 Total Sample – Results – 
Figure 3, as the benchmark 10-year government bond rate declined 110 basis points 
between 2011 and 2013. Corporates would have been inclined to issue more debt, 
while market values of equity remained constant, thus inflating leverage ratios. Figure 
6 indicates that equity was stagnant between years 2012 and 2013, before increasing 
toward the end of 2013. From which, leverage ratios decline and ‘normalise’. Again, 
increasing interest rates and overall higher equity prices, would result in an impact to 
both the numerator and denominator of the leverage ratio.  
The numerical analysis of each leverage ratio, for the period 1994 to 2016 is 
summarised in Table 11 and Appendix A-5. Individual leverage graphs, for TDBV, 
TDMV, TLBV and TLMV can be seen in Appendix A-6. 
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Table 11: Yearly Leverage for the Real Estate and REIT Sector 
Real Estate & REITs 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 5284% 5370% 102% 107% 
1995 5166% 5231% 57% 59% 
1996 1675% 1715% 87% 93% 
1997 1653% 1700% 89% 96% 
1998 354% 375% 46% 53% 
1999 70% 194% 10% 34% 
2000 135% 160% 18% 22% 
2001 99% 117% 17% 23% 
2002 1355% 1458% 24% 29% 
2003 1161% 2179% 35% 49% 
2004 1738% 1936% 34% 40% 
2005 2764% 3119% 34% 43% 
2006 3363% 3846% 77% 90% 
2007 6293% 6607% 85% 99% 
2008 515% 560% 156% 175% 
2009 478% 520% 103% 117% 
2010 424% 468% 85% 101% 
2011 418% 455% 105% 121% 
2012 1523% 1631% 84% 98% 
2013 3106% 3292% 80% 90% 
2014 103% 114% 56% 63% 
2015 55% 62% 52% 59% 
2016 55% 63% 57% 64% 
          
Average 1643% 1790% 65% 75% 
Min  55% 62% 10% 22% 
Max 6293% 6607% 156% 175% 
Std Dev 1856% 1929% 36% 38% 
Range 6238% 6544% 146% 152% 
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4.3.2. Real Estate and REITs – Term Structure of Leverage 
 
Figure 7: Long term and Short term Debt relative to Total Debt and Long term and 
Short term Liabilities relative to Total Liabilities 
 
 
Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of the preferred term structure of debt. 
As displayed in Figure 7, holdings of long term debt were consistently and 
significantly larger than those of short term debt, averaging 88.37% of total debt 
across the period, relative to 5.57% of short term debt. Non-current liabilities were 
also considerably larger than current liabilities at an average of 82% of total liabilities 
for the period, and short term liabilities to total liabilities an average of 18%.  
As an explanation; managers may wish to match the term of their debt financing to 
that of their investment assets, in order to adequately finance their operations.  
Current liabilities were, however, largely used in 1998, corresponding with extremely 
high interest rates. The East Asian crisis had resulted in a sell off of SA bonds, thus 
decreasing bond prices and increasing interest rates. Long and short term debt 
became expensive relative to current liabilities, including trade payables, and 
therefore less preferred. (Stals, 1996B) 
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4.3.3. Real Estate Investments and REITs – Correlation & Significance 
Results 
 
The correlation analysis, for the real estate and REIT sector, has been documented in 
a correlation matrix in Table 12, while the regression models, per leverage ratio have 
been summarised in Table 13, the results of the correlation and significance analysis 
are summarised below. Statistical significance has been documented at the 5% and 
1% levels. The results reflected in the real estate and REIT sector are, however, 
varied and statistical significance is limited, thus the results will be presented 
accordingly; 
o PROF, CORD and TAX are positively correlated to the accounting measures of 
leverage; TDBV and TLBV. However, negatively related to our market ratios of 
TDMV and TLMV. None of these correlations are statistically significant.  
 
o SIZE and GROW have an inverse relationship to the relationship documented 
above. These determinants have a negative relationship to the accounting ratios, 
namely TDBV and TLBV and a positive correlation with TDMV and TLMV. Again, 
neither of these correlations are statistically significant. 
 
o TANG has a positive correlation to all leverage ratios, with a significant 
relationship at the 0.01 level for TDMV and TLMV (both the market measures). 
These haphazard results make their interpretation thereof challenging. It can be 
interpreted, however, with confidence, that there is no relationship between capital 
structure determinants and debt measures when using the book value of equity, as 
none of the determinants were significantly related to TDBV and TLBV. Confirming 
this, the associated adjusted R2, in models TDBV and TLBV, revealed no good fit in 
the linear regression. It can also be determined, with confidence, that the tangibility of 
assets has an overall positive relationship to leverage and a significant positive 
correlation to debt measures when using equity at market value. This is consistent 
with much of the past literature, which found a positive relationship. 
These results may be intuitive given the primary operations of real estate and REIT 
firms. These firms make significant investments in tangible assets, such as fixed 
commercial properties and land of which they may renovate, rebuild and 
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subsequently rent or sell to generate revenue. Thus, intuitively, tangibility of these 
assets may drive capital structure decisions of managers of real estate and REIT 
firms. Greater fixed assets also provide lenders with suitable security in the event of 
default, thus increasing the debt capacity of REITs. This positive relationship supports 
the trade-off theory and specifically the findings of past literature based on REITs, 
namely Smith (2010) and Harrison, et al. (2011). 
Table 12, 13 and 14 below provide a summary of the following; correlation between 
the four leverage ratios and 6 capital structure determinants, the regression model for 
each of the leverage ratios and the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 12: Correlation between dependent variables and determinants for the Real 
Estate and REIT Sector  
Correlation - Real Estate and REIT 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV SIZE TANG PROF GROW CORD TAX 
TDBV 1.0 0.994 0.215 0.176 -0.212 0.308 0.297 -0.267 0.202 0.436 
TLBV 0.994 1.0 0.186 0.990 -0.193 -0.193 0.300 -0.247 0.175 0.412 
TDMV 0.215 0.186 1.0 0.990 0.207 0.207 -0.273 0.148 -0.054 -0.006 
TLMV 0.176 0.990 0.990 1.0 0.264 0.264 -0.312 0.212 -0.095 -0.075 
SIZE  -0.212 -0.193 0.207 0.264 1.0 -0.057 -0.022 0.985 -0.833 -0.890 
TANG 0.308 0.254 0.638 0.579 -0.057 1.0 0.196 -0.122 -0.064 0.296 
PROF 0.297 0.300 -0.273 -0.312 -0.022 0.196 1.0 -0.042 -0.245 0.131 
GROW -0.267 -0.247 0.148 0.212 0.985 -0.122 -0.042 1.0 -0.791 -0.937 
CORD 0.202 0.175 -0.054 -0.095 -0.833 -0.064 -0.245 -0.791 1.0 0.725 
TAX 0.436 0.412 -0.006 -0.075 -0.890 0.296 0.131 -0.937 0.725 1.0 
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Table 13: Regression Statistics for the Real Estate and REIT Sector 
 
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate 
 
1 0.632333 0.399845 0.174787 1686.37%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 3031.491351 6 505.248558 1.776631 0.167540 
Residual  4550.172585 16 284.385787    
Total  7581.663936 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDBV (constant) -395.111609 293.582581 -1.34583 0.19712 
SIZE   9.445938 18.461177 0.51167 0.61587 
TANG   1.868852 16.106546 0.11603 0.90907 
PROF   102.210993 95.092048 1.07486 0.29838 
GROW   1.220832 20.871400 0.05849 0.95408 
CORD   163.345104 217.136335 0.75227 0.46281 
TAX   796.954752 649.752645 1.22655 0.23774 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV  
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.610830 0.373114 0.138031 1790.96%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 3054.520248 6 509.086708 1.587162 0.214580 
Residual  5132.044493 16 320.752781    
Total  8186.564741 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLBV (constant) -429.398548 311.789551 -1.377206 0.187412 
SIZE   8.833357 19.606075 0.450542 0.658365 
TANG   -3.132679 17.105417 -0.183140 0.856989 
PROF   102.475521 100.989325 1.014716 0.325341 
GROW   2.515293 22.165772 0.113476 0.911065 
CORD   134.437887 230.602374 0.582986 0.568030 
TAX   895.702694 690.048042 1.298029 0.212678 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.834591 0.696543 0.582746 23.09%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 1.957709 6 0.326285 6.120949 0.001729 
Residual  0.852900 16 0.053306    
Total  2.810609 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDMV (constant) 0.522763 4.019439 0.130059 0.898141 
SIZE   0.407333 0.252752 1.611590 0.126599 
TANG   0.951358 0.220515 4.314262 0.000535 
PROF   -1.929500 1.301905 -1.482059 0.157751 
GROW   -0.309431 0.285750 -1.082873 0.294915 
CORD   4.909982 2.972813 1.651628 0.118097 
TAX   -4.400852 8.895763 -0.494713 0.627527 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.812215 0.659693 0.532078 25.82%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 2.068376 6 0.344729 5.169396 0.003947 
Residual  1.066985 16 0.066687    
Total  3.135362 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLMV (constant) -0.382916 4.495682 -0.085174 0.933180 
SIZE   0.355890 0.282699 1.258899 0.226125 
TANG   0.922422 0.246642 3.739918 0.001785 
PROF   -2.472954 1.456161 -1.698269 0.108816 
GROW   -0.232777 0.319607 -0.728322 0.476942 
CORD   4.397279 3.325047 1.322471 0.204605 
TAX   -2.403517 9.949778 -0.241565 0.812186 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for the Real Estate and REIT Sector 
Descriptive Statistics - Real Estate and REIT 
  N Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  
TDBV 23 54.88% 6293.11% 1642.94% 1856.40% 
TLBV 23 62.19% 6606.63% 1790.00% 1929.03% 
TDMV 23 9.73% 155.98% 64.84% 35.74% 
TLMV 23 22.28% 174.53% 75.07% 37.75% 
SIZE 23                  9.99                 15.06                 13.13                   1.84  
TANG 23 3.70% 89.36% 45.28% 27.54% 
PROF 23 -10.41% 13.77% 6.81% 4.83% 
GROW 23                12.30                 17.77                 15.70                   1.93  
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N 23        
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4.4. Travel and Leisure 
 
4.4.1. Travel and Leisure – Leverage Results 
 
Figure 8: Leverage Ratios for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
 
 
Figure 9: JSE Travel Index – Price Performance for the period 1995 – 2016 
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Firms within the travel and leisure sector of this study accounted for a total of 15 
firms. 
Figure 8 provides a graphical representation of the different leverage ratios for the 
Travel and Leisure sector, for period 1994 to 2016. Figure 9 is the performance of the 
JSE Travel & Leisure Index for the period 1995 to 2016.  
Overall there has been an increase in the use of leverage, with notable increases in 
the years 2007, 2008 and 2015 and 2016. As described in Chapter 2, interest rates 
had declined in 2004 and this continued into 2006, until rates begun rising to control 
inflation. REITs would have, therefore, found it attractive to utilise debt financing in the 
periods leading up to 2008. From June 2006 to June 2008, the repurchase rate had 
increased by 5% to 12% and the prime lending rate moved to 15.5%, consequently 
the use of leverage fell as seen in Figure 8. (Marcus, 2011) 
To corroborate; Figure 3, presented in 4.2.1 – Total Sample – Results, displaying the 
benchmark 10-year government bond, portrays a decline in government bond rates 
for 2003 to 2006 and increasing rates thereafter. An additional and significant 
contributing factor can be seen in Figure 9; performance of the JSE Travel and 
Leisure Index. Late 2006, mid-2007 the travel and leisure index slumped significantly, 
a result of the Global Financial crisis, thus the market value of equity in these firms’ 
capital structures would have declined substantially, thus inflating their debt ratios and 
causing the spike seen in late 2007, 2008.  
The upward cycle in interest rates, used to control inflation, consequently moved into 
a downward trajectory, as inflation begun to moderate. The repurchase rate declined 
to 7% by the end of 2009 and remained within the range of 5% to 7% for the years up 
until 2016. As expected, debt would have been relatively cheaper and thus used more 
extensively in the capital structure of these firms. This can be seen in the second, 
notable increase in leverage, beginning in 2013. (Kganyago, 2016B)  
The slump in performance of equity within this sector of the JSE, occurring in 2014, 
as seen in Figure 9, for 2014 would also contribute to the second incline in leverage 
ratios, as the denominator would have declined.  
The numerical analysis of each leverage ratio, for the period 1994 to 2016 is 
summarised in Table 15 and Appendix A-7. Individual leverage graphs, for TDBV, 
TDMV, TLBV and TLMV can be seen in Appendix A-8. 
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Table 15: Yearly Leverage for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
Travel & Leisure 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 24% 62% 15% 36% 
1995 21% 65% 18% 48% 
1996 9% 45% 5% 30% 
1997 14% 51% 13% 46% 
1998 12% 39% 20% 60% 
1999 31% 76% 33% 89% 
2000 30% 72% 35% 78% 
2001 37% 72% 47% 87% 
2002 41% 74% 71% 115% 
2003 29% 65% 38% 73% 
2004 27% 68% 26% 50% 
2005 39% 78% 20% 36% 
2006 47% 85% 19% 34% 
2007 78% 120% 16% 26% 
2008 335% 451% 38% 56% 
2009 168% 229% 44% 63% 
2010 106% 156% 38% 58% 
2011 77% 125% 31% 52% 
2012 73% 120% 24% 40% 
2013 58% 107% 23% 40% 
2014 91% 164% 24% 44% 
2015 133% 196% 40% 60% 
2016 332% 576% 43% 79% 
          
Average 79% 135% 30% 57% 
Min  9% 39% 5% 26% 
Max 335% 576% 71% 115% 
Std Dev 90% 130% 14% 22% 
Range 326% 536% 66% 89% 
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4.4.2. Travel and Leisure – Term Structure of Leverage 
 
Figure 10: Long term and Short term Debt relative to Total Debt and Long term and 
Short term Liabilities relative to Total Liabilities 
 
 
Figure 10 provides a graphical representation of the preferred term structure of debt. 
This graph displays the most variation between the use of short and long term debt 
and liabilities, compared to the total sample and real estate and REIT and 
construction and materials sectors.  
Similar, to the total sample, the use of short term debt significantly surpasses that of 
long term debt between years 1995 and 1997. In the years leading up to 1995, 
liquidity was low and the demand for short term financing rose significantly. Increased 
demand for short term funds subsequently increased interest rates. Firms, thus 
shifted back into relatively cheaper long term debt. Holdings of long term debt relative 
to total debt peaked in 1999, after which although larger, were not significantly greater 
than that of short term holdings. In 2005 and 2016 we see a convergence in short 
term and long term debt, with long term holdings decreasing and short term holdings 
increasing. Travel firms appear to use short and long term debt interchangeably, as 
seen in Figure 10, these firms commonly substitute one in place of the other.  
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4.4.3. Travel and Leisure – Correlation & Significance Results 
 
The correlation analysis, for the travel and leisure sector, has been documented in a 
correlation matrix in Table 16, while the regression models, per leverage ratio have 
been summarised in Table 17, the results of the correlation and significance analysis 
are summarised below. Statistical significance has been documented at the 5% and 
1% levels.  
The results of the travel and leisure sector with regards to TDBV and TLBV, the book 
value measures of leverage are as follows; 
o SIZE, PROF and GROWTH are positively correlated to TDBV and TLBV. 
 
o TANG, CORD and TAX are negatively correlated to TDBV and TLBV. 
There is however no statistical significance between the capital structure 
determinants and TDBV and TLBV, these determinants are therefore unable to 
predict the variability of leverage when using accounting ratios. Adjusted R2, 
indicating that there is no good fit in the regression models; TDBV and TLBV. This 
finding is consistent with that of the real estate and REIT sector, presented in section 
4.3.3, in which no significance was found between the capital structure determinants 
and accounting ratios; TDBV and TLBV. 
When interpreting the results relative to TDMV and TLMV, the market value measures 
of leverage, the following is noted; 
o Adjusted R2 is higher indicating a reasonable fit in the regression models; TDMV 
and TLMV. 
 
o SIZE and GROWTH are positively correlated to TDMV and negatively correlated 
to TLMV. SIZE has no statistical significance, while GROWTH displays a statistical 
significance at the 0.05 level to TLMV. 
 
o TANG, PROF and TAX are negatively correlated to TDMV and TLMV. TANG is 
significantly related to TDMV at the 0.05 level, however PROF and TAX are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level toward both TDMV and TLMV. 
 
o CORD has a negative correlation to TDMV and a positive correlation to TLMV. 
With no statistical significance.  
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Interestingly, these results are supported by a study completed over a sample of firms 
in the lodging sector of the Turkish stock exchange. Similar, size of these Turkish 
firms had no relationship to leverage, nor did growth (when using the book value 
measures). Further, tangibility, profitability and tax rate had a statistically significant 
and negative relationship to leverage of these firms, exactly comparable to the 
findings noted above. Generally, the findings above support the pecking order theory, 
given the negative relationships between determinants; tangibility and profitability and 
leverage. Further the negative relationship between tax and leverage, specifically 
rejects the trade-off theory, which would imply a positive relationship. (Karadeniz, et 
al., 2009) 
Table 16, 17 and 18 below provide a summary of the following; correlation between 
the four leverage ratios and 6 capital structure determinants, the regression model for 
each of the leverage ratios and the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 16: Correlation between dependent variables and determinants for the Travel 
and Leisure Sector 
Correlation - Travel and Leisure 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV SIZE TANG PROF GROW CORD TAX 
TDBV 1.0 0.985 0.372 0.128 0.329 -0.179 0.302 0.237 -0.325 -0.501 
TLBV 0.985 1.0 0.345 0.867 0.323 0.323 0.275 0.215 -0.311 -0.456 
TDMV 0.372 0.345 1.0 0.867 0.018 0.018 -0.347 0.048 -0.264 -0.476 
TLMV 0.128 0.867 0.867 1.0 -0.292 -0.292 -0.623 -0.181 0.069 -0.186 
SIZE  0.329 0.323 0.018 -0.292 1.0 -0.143 0.353 0.910 -0.683 -0.585 
TANG -0.179 -0.242 -0.225 -0.450 -0.143 1.0 0.419 -0.291 -0.002 0.287 
PROF 0.302 0.275 -0.347 -0.623 0.353 0.419 1.0 0.064 -0.318 -0.356 
GROW 0.237 0.215 0.048 -0.181 0.910 -0.291 0.064 1.0 -0.523 -0.486 
CORD -0.325 -0.311 -0.264 0.069 -0.683 -0.002 -0.318 -0.523 1.0 0.725 
TAX -0.501 -0.456 -0.476 -0.186 -0.585 0.287 -0.356 -0.486 0.725 1.0 
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Table 17: Regression Statistics for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
 
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate 
 
1 0.539954 0.291551 0.025882 88.74%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 5.185333 6 0.864222 1.097422 0.405639 
Residual  12.600028 16 0.787502    
Total  17.785361 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDBV (constant) 4.830169 8.991479 0.53719 0.59853 
SIZE   0.374216 1.482104 0.25249 0.80388 
TANG   -1.832034 3.561965 -0.51433 0.61405 
PROF   3.351156 6.877910 0.48723 0.63270 
GROW   -0.321706 1.378398 -0.23339 0.81842 
CORD   2.028154 8.863044 0.22883 0.82190 
TAX   -14.848390 13.918556 -1.06681 0.30189 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.538546196 0.290032005 0.023794007 129%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 10.856323 6 1.809387 1.089371 0.409810 
Residual  26.575143 16 1.660946    
Total  37.431467 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLBV (constant) 7.443135 13.058196 0.569997 0.576597 
SIZE   1.148708 2.152439 0.533678 0.600901 
TANG   -5.091160 5.172991 -0.984181 0.339676 
PROF   4.767925 9.988690 0.477332 0.639581 
GROW   -1.122052 2.001827 -0.560514 0.582893 
CORD   1.137868 12.871672 0.088401 0.930655 
TAX   -13.603289 20.213720 -0.672973 0.510568 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.846703 0.716907 0.610747 9.03%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 0.330040 6 0.055007 6.753081 0.001041 
Residual  0.130327 16 0.008145    
Total  0.460367 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDMV (constant) 3.058401 0.914455 3.344507 0.004115 
SIZE   0.214262 0.150734 1.421464 0.174381 
TANG   0.787898 0.362260 2.174949 0.044975 
PROF   -3.125360 0.699500 -4.467992 0.000388 
GROW   -0.263171 0.140186 -1.877296 0.078833 
CORD   1.140147 0.901393 1.264873 0.224030 
TAX   -6.760759 1.415551 -4.776063 0.000206 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.885381 0.783899 0.702861 11.95%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 0.829227 6 0.138204 9.673255 0.000140 
Residual  0.228596 16 0.014287    
Total  1.057823 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLMV (constant) 5.846917 1.211100 4.827773 0.000186 
SIZE   0.259112 0.199631 1.297957 0.212702 
TANG   0.145401 0.479776 0.303059 0.765749 
PROF   -4.569334 0.926415 -4.932277 0.000150 
GROW   -0.422445 0.185662 -2.275343 0.036993 
CORD   1.720030 1.193801 1.440801 0.168924 
TAX   -7.716663 1.874749 -4.116105 0.000809 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
Descriptive Statistics - Travel and Leisure 
  N Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  
TDBV 23 9.09% 335.43% 78.79% 89.91% 
TLBV 23 39.33% 575.64% 134.72% 130.44% 
TDMV 23 4.93% 71.41% 29.60% 14.47% 
TLMV 23 26.08% 115.02% 56.51% 21.93% 
SIZE 23                13.84                 15.65                 14.49                   0.53  
TANG 23 39.93% 66.16% 54.83% 7.57% 
PROF 23 6.62% 25.80% 15.72% 4.88% 
GROW 23                14.34                 16.08                 14.95                   0.48  
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N 23        
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4.5. Construction and Materials 
 
4.5.1. Construction and Materials – Leverage Results  
 
Figure 11: Leverage Ratios for the Construction and Materials Sector 
 
 
Figure 12: JSE Construction Index – Price Performance for the period 1995 – 2016 
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Firms within the construction and materials sector accounted for a total of 14 firms. 
Figure 11 provides a graphical representation of the different leverage ratios for the 
construction and materials sector, for period 1994 to 2016. Figure 12 is the 
performance of the JSE Construction and Materials Index for the period 1995 to 2016.  
The changes in leverage within this sector were muted relative to those seen in the 
total sample and real estate and REIT sectors. Overall debt levels increased steadily 
across the sample period, with an accelerated increase in leverage ratios between 
2007 and 2009. This increase and subsequent decrease, however, was dissimilar to 
that of both the total sample and the real estate and REIT sector. The following 
differences can be seen;  
o The increase in leverage ratios, occurred at a steady pace and did not peak as 
significantly and suddenly, as seen in 4.2.1 – Total Sample – Results - Figure 1 – 
Leverage ratios for the total sample and 4.3.1 – Real Estate and REITs – Results 
– Figure 5 – Leverage ratios for Real Estate and REITs.  
 
o The subsequent decline in leverage ratios, which occurred across years; 2008, 
2009 and 2010, was less abrupt compared to that of both the total sample and real 
estate and REIT sector, as seen comparatively in Figure 1 and 5 (full reference 
disclosed above). 
 
o Further, leverage ratios within the construction and materials sector, as seen in 
Figure 11, did not decline significantly afterward. The decline was minor and 
dissimilar to the other sectors. The ratios, after declining, remained higher relative 
to those recorded pre-2007. These results, therefore, have an interesting 
interpretation.  
The interpretation of trends seen in the construction sector are described as follows;  
When the Global Financial Crisis crippled equity markets, sectors on the JSE 
contracted as their market values plummeted. Gold, platinum and construction 
sectors did not contract to the same extent. On inspection of Figure 12, the following 
is determined;  
o Equity prices rise considerably from 2005 to 2007, seen in Figure 12 of the JSE 
Construction Index. During this timeframe we would expect to see a decline in 
leverage ratios (numerator increased) – this is evident and portrayed in Figure 11. 
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o As seen in Figure 12, a decline in the Index occurs between years 2007 and 2008 
amid the Global financial crisis in which we would expect leverage ratios to 
increase as the numerator in each of the market ratios has decreased – this is 
demonstrated in the trend line in Figure 11. 
 
o Surprising, however, performance of the construction and materials index did not 
dip significantly below the performance recorded prior to the spike, i.e. pre-2006. 
 
o Gold, precious metals and the construction sector, as described in Chapter 2, 
were considered by the market as safe havens against major economic 
fluctuations and did not contract significantly during the Global Financial crisis of 
2008. 
 
o As such leverage ratios within the construction sector, did not fluctuate abruptly in 
response to the equity collapse. While leverage ratios increased, they did not 
increase to the same extent seen in each of the other sectors. 
 
o Interest rate movements, where not a significant contributing factor to the changes 
noted in this sector. In support of this statement, Figure 3, is revisited. Figure 3 
represents the benchmark 10-year government bond rate, for years 2003 to 2016. 
On inspection of Figure 3, under sub-section 4.2.1., we note that the benchmark 10-
year government bond rate increases steadily between 2006 and 2010, from 6.8% to 
7.7%, therefore corporate debt became increasingly expensive across this period. As 
a result, we would expect leverage ratios to decline across this timeframe.  
In contrast, as seen in Figure 12, leverage ratios increase at an accelerated pace 
between years 2007 and 2009. Leverage ratios, do not decrease, as expected, in 
response to the interest rate movements. Thus, in aggregate, construction firms were 
not altering leverage downward as a result of changes in monetary policy. 
This finding, unique to the results displayed in each of the other sectors, reinforces 
the belief that the construction sector was hedged against major equity movements, 
by its nature, during the Global crisis and equity downturn. Further, interest rates had 
little impact on the fluctuations seen in leverage. 
The numerical analysis of each leverage ratio, for the period 1994 to 2016 is 
summarised in Table 19 and Appendix A-9. Individual leverage graphs, for TDBV, 
TDMV, TLBV and TLMV can be seen in Appendix A-10. 
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Table 19: Yearly Leverage for the Construction and Materials Sector 
Construction & Materials 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 19% 98% 24% 95% 
1995 23% 107% 10% 44% 
1996 27% 119% 16% 65% 
1997 34% 130% 23% 84% 
1998 31% 142% 40% 169% 
1999 21% 110% 39% 219% 
2000 21% 114% 24% 141% 
2001 38% 159% 29% 131% 
2002 34% 145% 28% 124% 
2003 31% 127% 22% 89% 
2004 36% 123% 20% 68% 
2005 31% 128% 14% 58% 
2006 47% 177% 12% 55% 
2007 41% 164% 8% 37% 
2008 39% 193% 8% 53% 
2009 120% 285% 20% 96% 
2010 116% 265% 18% 94% 
2011 95% 241% 19% 100% 
2012 87% 235% 19% 106% 
2013 66% 196% 22% 111% 
2014 88% 220% 27% 113% 
2015 82% 177% 50% 150% 
2016 66% 172% 52% 187% 
          
Average 52% 166% 24% 104% 
Min  19% 98% 8% 37% 
Max 120% 285% 52% 219% 
Std Dev 31% 53% 12% 47% 
Range 102% 188% 44% 182% 
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4.5.2. Construction and Materials – Term Structure of Leverage 
 
Figure 13: Long term and Short term Debt relative to Total Debt and Long term and 
Short term Liabilities relative to Total Liabilities 
 
 
Figure 13 provides a graphical representation of the preferred term structure of debt. 
An interesting finding, displayed in Figure 13, and unlike the other sectors, is the 
preferred use of current liabilities relative to non-current liabilities. Current liabilities 
were consistently and significantly greater than the use of non-current liabilities and 
further exceeded the use of long term debt for a sustained period of 10 years 
beginning in 2004.  
This finding is supported by an article published by Van Zyl (2010), providing insight 
into the preferred use of financing within the construction and materials sector of the 
JSE. The findings indicated that, on average, for the period 2000 to 2009, the use of 
other current liabilities relative to total capital was highest at 48.83%, following that, 
equity at 34.15%, lastly long term and short term debt made up 8.87% and 8.05% of 
total capital, respectively. The results presented in this study corroborate the high use 
of current liabilities which averaged 69.49% of total liabilities for years 1994 to 2016. 
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4.5.3. Construction and Materials – Correlation & Significance Results 
 
The correlation analysis, for the construction and materials sector has been 
documented in a correlation matrix in Table 20, while the regression models, per 
leverage ratio have been summarised in Table 21, the results of the correlation and 
significance analysis are summarised below. Statistical significance has been 
documented at the 5% and 1% levels. The results of the construction and materials 
sector, similar to real estate and REITs, are varied and as follows; 
o All regressions models, displayed high adjusted R2 statistics, indicating a 
reasonable fit within each of the linear regression models. 
 
o SIZE is positively correlated to TDBV and TLBV ratios, while negatively correlated 
to both TDMV and TLMV with the following displaying statistical significance; 
TLBV at the 0.01 level and TDMV and TLMV at the 0.05 level. 
 
o TANG is negatively correlated to TDBV and TLBV, the book measures of 
leverage, with a significant relationship to both TDBV and TLBV at 0.05 level. 
TANG is positively related to TDMV and TLMV, the market measures of leverage, 
with no statistical significance.  
 
o PROF is negatively correlated to each of the leverage ratios. Furthermore, 
profitability reflects significant correlation at the 0.05 level for TDMV and at the 
0.01 level for TLMV. 
 
o GROW is positively correlated to each of the leverage ratios, except for TLMV. No 
significant correlation exists.  
 
o CORD is negatively related to each of the leverage ratios, with TDBV showing 
statistical significance at the 0.05 level.  
 
o TAX is negatively correlated to each of the leverage measures, with significance of 
TLMV at the 0.01 level.  
SIZE, TANG and PROF displayed the greatest significance, thus best predicting the 
changes in leverage for the sample of construction and materials firms. These 
findings, are somewhat similar to Baharuddin, et al., (2012), who studied the capital 
structure determinants of construction companies in Malaysia. The authors concluded 
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a positive relationship between size, tangibility and growth, the former (size and 
tangibility) supporting the trade-off theory, while the latter (growth) supporting the 
pecking order theory. This study, similar to the results of Baharuddin et al. (2011), 
also found a negative relationship between firm profitability and leverage, also 
supporting the pecking order theory of capital structure. These results support, neither 
the trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory.  
Furthermore, the results of this study follow the consensus findings as presented in 
Table 4, including the relationship between the cost of debt and leverage, which was 
found to be negative. While the Malaysian study, was in equal support of both 
theories, incorporating the cost of debt determinant in this study, results in overall 
support of the trade-off theory. (Baharuddin, et al., 2011)  
Table 20, 21 and 22 below provide a summary of the following; correlation between 
the four leverage ratios and 6 capital structure determinants, the regression model for 
each of the leverage ratios and the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 20: Correlation between dependent variables and determinants for the 
Construction and Materials Sector  
Correlation - Construction and Materials 
 TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV SIZE TANG PROF GROW CORD TAX 
TDBV 1.0 0.950 0.085 0.051 0.806 -0.367 -0.156 0.833 -0.684 -0.617 
TLBV 0.950 1.0 -0.080 -0.040 0.882 0.882 -0.056 0.849 -0.626 -0.678 
TDMV 0.085 -0.080 1.0 0.886 -0.160 -0.160 -0.628 0.039 -0.028 -0.188 
TLMV 0.051 -0.040 0.886 1.0 -0.160 -0.160 -0.726 -0.047 -0.003 -0.241 
SIZE  0.806 0.882 -0.160 -0.160 1.0 -0.702 0.034 0.941 -0.623 -0.712 
TANG -0.367 -0.493 0.297 0.352 -0.702 1.0 -0.415 -0.623 0.560 0.685 
PROF -0.156 -0.056 -0.628 -0.726 0.034 -0.415 1.0 -0.078 0.036 -0.012 
GROW 0.833 0.849 0.039 -0.047 0.941 -0.623 -0.078 1.0 -0.668 -0.743 
CORD -0.684 -0.626 -0.028 -0.003 -0.623 0.560 0.036 -0.668 1.0 0.725 
TAX -0.617 -0.678 -0.188 -0.241 -0.712 0.685 -0.012 -0.743 0.725 1.0 
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Table 21: Regression Statistics for the Construction and Materials Sector 
 
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate 
 
1 0.909805 0.827745 0.763150 15.26%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 1.791313 6 0.298552 12.814279 2.5027E-05 
Residual  0.372774 16 0.023298    
Total  2.164087 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDBV (constant) -8.181001 2.005122 -4.08005 0.00087 
SIZE   0.385832 0.199037 1.93849 0.07041 
TANG   2.320293 0.867731 2.67398 0.01663 
PROF   0.377071 0.661842 0.56973 0.57677 
GROW   0.147894 0.195737 0.75558 0.46088 
CORD   -2.664497 1.192275 -2.23480 0.04004 
TAX   -0.599965 2.375368 -0.25258 0.80381 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV  
 
110 | P a g e  
 
 
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.919068 0.844686 0.786443 24.68%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 5.298289 6 0.883048 14.502803 1.13241E-05 
Residual  0.974210 16 0.060888    
Total  6.272498 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLBV (constant) -12.516183 3.241484 -3.861251 0.001382 
SIZE   1.051439 0.321764 3.267731 0.004837 
TANG   3.175305 1.402776 2.263587 0.037855 
PROF   0.661690 1.069935 0.618440 0.544990 
GROW   -0.130671 0.316429 -0.412954 0.685121 
CORD   -1.825269 1.927434 -0.946994 0.357726 
TAX   -4.308431 3.840025 -1.121980 0.278427 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLBV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.828336 0.686141 0.568444 7.80%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 0.213011 6 0.035502 5.829722 0.002207 
Residual  0.097437 16 0.006090    
Total  0.310448 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TDMV (constant) 2.380347 1.025131 2.321994 0.033752 
SIZE   -0.273010 0.101759 -2.682902 0.016334 
TANG   0.140210 0.443633 0.316050 0.756050 
PROF   -0.934295 0.338371 -2.761158 0.013911 
GROW   0.195312 0.100072 1.951715 0.068702 
CORD   0.667461 0.609558 1.094992 0.289730 
TAX   -2.978465 1.214422 -2.452579 0.026038 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TDMV 
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(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
 
Model Summary 
    
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
Estimate  
1 0.926596 0.858581 0.805548 20.59%  
           
      
Anova      
Model  
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Regression 4.118756 6 0.686459 16.189772 5.50443E-06 
Residual  0.678413 16 0.042401    
Total  4.797169 22      
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
(b) Predictors: (constant), SIZE, TANG, PROF, GROW, CORD, TAX 
      
Coefficients 
     
    Unstandardized 
coefficients 
    
Model   t Sig. 
    B Std. Error     
TLMV (constant) 12.715509 2.704984 4.700771 0.000240 
SIZE   -0.198563 0.268509 -0.739502 0.470314 
TANG   2.013802 1.170601 1.720314 0.104654 
PROF   -4.677551 0.892849 -5.238903 0.000081 
GROW   -0.215916 0.264057 -0.817689 0.425545 
CORD   2.876477 1.608423 1.788383 0.092664 
TAX   -18.711199 3.204460 -5.839111 0.000025 
            
(a) Dependent Variable: TLMV 
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Table 22: Descriptive Statistics for the Construction and Materials Sector 
Descriptive Statistics - Construction and Materials 
  N Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  
TDBV 23 18.87% 120.50% 51.91% 31.36% 
TLBV 23 97.80% 285.45% 166.40% 53.40% 
TDMV 23 7.85% 51.53% 23.61% 11.88% 
TLMV 23 37.09% 218.81% 103.83% 46.70% 
SIZE 23                14.57                 16.49                 15.75                   0.55  
TANG 23 25.77% 49.85% 34.64% 7.21% 
PROF 23 7.17% 28.54% 14.21% 6.29% 
GROW 23                14.40                 16.35                 15.57                   0.56  
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N 23        
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether changes in the South African 
economic environment and capital markets resulted in a change in the capital 
structure of corporates in South Africa for the period 1994 to 2016. Further to this, the 
study investigated which capital structure determinants were best able to predict the 
changes in the leverage of these firms.  
The study investigates 76 firms across the real estate and REIT, travel and leisure 
and construction and materials sectors of the JSE. Four leverage measures are used, 
two accounting measures; total debt to book value of equity, total liabilities to book 
value of equity and two market measures; total debt to market value of equity and 
total liabilities to market value of equity. The capital structure determinants used in the 
study include; firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, growth, the cost of debt and the 
corporate tax rate.   
The South African economic landscape was characterised by the effects of notable 
events such as the East Asian Crisis of 1998, the US sub-prime bubble of 2007 and 
the Eurozone crisis of 2009. These events, including developments in the local capital 
market, such as the establishment of the Bond Exchange of South Africa, impacted 
the availability and cost of external financing for corporates. In totality, debt of South 
African firms increased for the period 1994 to 2016, with significant and exponential 
increases in the use of leverage observed in 2004 to 2007 and again from 2011 to 
2013. Following each increase, sharp declines in leverage were noted in the periods 
2007 to 2008 and 2013 to 2014. It follows that these changes were a result of 
fluctuating interest rates which impacted the attractiveness of debt financing, and the 
Global Financial crisis.   
Lower interest rates observed in 2004, would have resulted in a greater use of 
relatively cheaper debt financing, further to this, improvements to the country’s credit 
rating in 2005 had incentivised firms to issue public debt, as South African bonds 
became sought after. Conversely the stark increase in interest rates from June 2006 
to 2008 reduced debt levels, as it became an expensive source of finance.  
Similarly, low interest rates of 2012 would have encouraged the use of debt by 
corporates, in addition, in 2012 the BESA was included in World Government Bond 
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Index of Citibank, again promoting investment in bonds and encouraging South 
African firms to issue public debt. Moving into 2013 and 2014, however, inflation 
increased, and monetary policy was tightened, thus curbing the use of debt, reflected 
by a sharp decline in leverage. The interest rate environment and efficiency of the 
capital market contributed significantly to the changes seen in the capital structure of 
firms within SA.  
The analysis of the long and short term debt relative to total debt and non-current and 
current liabilities relative to total liabilities, indicated that firms made use of a greater 
amount of long term-debt relative to total debt. This was apparent for the total sample, 
real estate and REITs and the construction and materials sector. Whereas, the travel 
and leisure sector utilised similar amounts of long and short term debt for the duration 
of 2000 to 2016 and utilised non-current and current liabilities in equal parts. The total 
sample showed preference toward non-current liabilities, similar, REITs employed 
significantly larger amounts of non-current liabilities. Dissimilar, the construction and 
materials sector showed a preference for current liabilities. 
The analysis of the capital determinants on leverage had the following results;  
o Firm Size; showed a positive and statistically significant relationship toward 
TDMV and TLMV for the total sample. Larger firms on average employ greater 
amounts of debt in their capital structure, this is consistent with trade off theory, 
as larger firms have increased diversification and thus lower chances of 
bankruptcy. This finding is consistent with the majority of studies reviewed in this 
paper, including; Smith (2010); Baharuddin et al. (2011); Harrison et al. (2011); 
and a study by Chipeta (2016) and Slabbert (2018) of firms listed on the JSE. 
 
Firm size and leverage for the real estate and REIT and travel and leisure sectors 
showed no significance, while the construction and materials sector showed 
mixed statistical significance. Firm size was significantly positively correlated to 
TLBV, whereas firm size and TDMV and TLMV had a significant negative 
relationship. This negative relationship is consistent with the findings of Kumar 
and Bodla (2014) and Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. (2015). Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et 
al. (2015) indicated that larger firms have fewer information asymmetries and as 
such are able to freely issue equity, this is consistent with the pecking order 
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theory. The results above indicate that the total sample is in support of the trade-
off theory.  
 
o Asset Tangibility; showed no statistical significance toward the total sample, 
however at a sector level, reflected the following; tangibility of real estate and 
REIT assets was positively correlated to all leverage measures, with statistical 
significance toward TDMV and TLMV. This positive relationship, as hypothesised 
by the trade-off theory, is supported by the majority of studies reviewed in this 
paper, including; Smith (2010); Harrison et al. (2011); Noulas and Genimakis 
(2011); and Chipeta (2016).  
 
A negative relationship was found between tangibility of the travel and leisure 
sector and all leverage measures, with statistical significance toward TDMV. The 
results of the construction and materials sector varied, however a significant 
negative relationship was found between TDBV and TLBV. The negative 
relationships described above, support the pecking order theory and similar (to 
firm size), is a result of lower information asymmetries associated with fixed 
assets. Comparable results were found by Kazmierska-Jozwiak, et al. (2015) and 
Slabbert (2018), these authors having both conducted their study in an emerging 
market. An alternative explanation, as suggested by Chipeta (2016); highlights 
that firms with large amounts of fixed assets, may already be highly levered and 
wish to avoid additional debt. Further, the findings of Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
(2015), established that firms with a higher share of fixed assets had a lower 
propensity to incur debt. These varied results, support, in entirety, neither the 
trade-off nor pecking order theory. 
 
o Profitability; the total sample, travel and leisure sector and construction and 
materials sector reflected a significant negative correlation toward TDMV and 
TLMV, while a significantly positive relationship was found between the total 
sample and TDBV and TLBV. These results support the hypothesis that findings 
will differ based on the leverage measure used and comparable to Noulas and 
Genimakis, (2011) who indicated that their regression results differed significantly 
dependant on the leverage measure and the sector examined. 
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Most of the literature, including studies examining the travel and construction 
sectors found a negative correlation, including authors; Karadeniz et al. (2009); 
Baharuddin et al. (2011); Sbeti and Moosa (2012); Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. 
(2015); and Chipeta (2016). Therefore, the consensus opinion and most results 
found in this study support for the pecking order theory, as firms with greater 
profitability, enjoy an increase in internal funds available for use. The positive 
relationship, however, would support the trade-off theory and may arise when 
profitable firms wish to shield earnings from tax. (Panno, 2003) 
 
o Growth; the total sample displayed a positive relationship toward all leverage 
measures and a significantly positive relationship toward TDBV and TLBV. A 
positive relationship was also found by authors; Smith (2010); Baharuddin et al. 
(2011); Kazmierska-Jozwiak et al. (2015); Chipeta (2016); and Slabbert (2018). 
Positive findings, in support of the pecking order theory, indicate firms with higher 
growth opportunities have greater financing needs, therefore utilising more debt.  
 
The travel and leisure sector had a statistically negative relationship between 
growth and TLMV. A comparable study completed by Karadeniz et al. (2009), in 
the travel and leisure sector, had insignificant results between growth and 
leverage. The author, regardless, in support of the trade-off theory, suggested 
that a negative relationship would occur if growth opportunities were associated 
with higher financial risk and therefore financial distress. Further to this high-
growth firms may wish to finance growth with equity as to avoid idle capacity 
associated with debt. This may be relevant to the travel and leisure sector as it is 
considered capital intensive and sensitive to systematic risks, thus equity finance 
is preferred for growth opportunities. (Karadeniz, et al., 2009). The consensus 
finding, however and results of the total sample, largely support the pecking order 
theory. 
  
o Cost of Debt; a negative, statistically significant result was found for both the 
overall sample and the construction and materials sector. These results are 
consistent with Harrison et al. (2011); Kumar and Bodla (2014) and Slabbert 
(2018), authors who found a negative relationship between the cost of borrowing 
and leverage. The latter two studies, similar to this paper were conducted in 
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emerging markets. These authors concluded that when the cost of debt 
increases, decision makers within the firm rely less on debt and more on equity 
financing. All findings, including literature, is unanimously in support of the trade-
off theory of capital structure. (Kumar& Bodla, 2014) (Slabbert, 2018) 
 
o Corporate Tax Rate; the total sample, travel and leisure sector and construction 
and materials sector reflected a negative relationship toward all leverage 
measures, with a significant negative relationship toward TDMV and TLMV. This 
is consistent with the findings of Karadeniz et al. (2009) and Slabbert (2018). 
These findings contradict the implied relationship of trade-off theory, while the 
pecking order theory does not specify a well-defined relationship. (Karadeniz et 
al., 2009) 
 
The real estate and REIT sector displayed no statistical significance, supported 
by the nature of REITs who have limited tax liabilities. Tax rates would, therefore, 
have little bearing on the capital structure decisions of such firms.  
 
An area for further study, would be as follows; an investigation of leverage before, 
during and after the Global Financial Crisis. As equity markets collapsed, firms’ capital 
structures, when measured using market values, would have changed drastically. As 
a result, managers, wishing to re-stabilise these ratios would have had to reduce 
leverage within their capital structure. An example thereof, would be a rights issue, 
whereby the firm could issue share at a favourable price, resulting in both an increase 
in equity and funding available to reduce debt.  Therefore, an investigation into how 
much leverage was reduced for the period occurring during and after the financial 
crisis would prove interesting.  
To conclude this study, overall, the results offer support for both capital structure 
theories. Furthermore, the findings indicate that South African firms have largely 
increased the amount of debt in their capital structure, as a result of an increased 
availability of debt financing. In addition, lifting of sanctions, establishment of the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa, and lower exchange rates contributed significantly to the 
increase in debt within firms’ capital structures.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A-1 Sample of Stocks 
Share Name  Ticker  Industry  
Adrenna Property Group Limited ANA Real Estate Investment Services 
Attacq Limited ATT Real Estate Investment Services 
Balwin Properties Pty Limited BWN Real Estate Investment Services 
Calgro M3 Holdings Limited CGR Real Estate Investment Services 
Capital & Counties Properties Plc CCO Real Estate Investment Services 
Echo Polska Properties EPP Real Estate Investment Services 
Fairvest Property Holdings Limited FVT Real Estate Investment Services 
Globe Trade Centre SA GTC Real Estate Investment Services 
Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd ING Real Estate Investment Services 
MAS Real Estate Inc MSP Real Estate Investment Services 
New Frontier Properties Limited NFP Real Estate Investment Services 
New Europe Property Investments NEP Real Estate Investment Services 
Putprop Limited PPR Real Estate Investment Services 
Sirius Real Estate Limited SRE Real Estate Investment Services 
Stenprop Limited STP Real Estate Investment Services 
Tradehold Limited TDH Real Estate Investment Services 
Visual International Holdings Limited VIS Real Estate Investment Services 
Accelerate Property Fund Limited APF Real Estate Investment Trust  
Ascension Properties Limited AIA Real Estate Investment Trust  
Growthpoint Properties Limited GRT Real Estate Investment Trust  
Atlantic Leaf Properties Limited ALP Real Estate Investment Trust  
Capital & Regional Plc CRP Real Estate Investment Trust  
Delta Property Fund Limited DLT Real Estate Investment Trust  
Emira Property Fund Limited EMI Real Estate Investment Trust  
Equites Property Fund Limited EQU Real Estate Investment Trust  
Hyprop Investments Limited HYP Real Estate Investment Trust  
Indluplace Properties Limited ILU Real Estate Investment Trust  
Investec Australia Property Fund IAP Real Estate Investment Trust  
Investec Property Fund Limited IPF Real Estate Investment Trust  
Liberty Two Degrees L2D Real Estate Investment Trust  
Mara Delta Property Holdings GTR Real Estate Investment Trust  
Newpark REIT Limited NRL Real Estate Investment Trust  
Octodec Investments Limited OCT Real Estate Investment Trust  
Orion Real Estate Limited ORE Real Estate Investment Trust  
Rebosis Property Fund Limited REB Real Estate Investment Trust  
Redefine International Plc RPL Real Estate Investment Trust  
SA Corporate Real Estate Limited SAC Real Estate Investment Trust  
Safari Investments RSA Limited SAR Real Estate Investment Trust  
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Appendix A-1 Sample of Stocks (continued) 
Share Name  Ticker  Industry  
Schroder European Real Estate Inv. Trust plc SCD Real Estate Investment Trust  
Stor-Age Property REIT Limited SSS Real Estate Investment Trust  
Synergy Income Fund Limited GPA Real Estate Investment Trust  
Texton Property Fund Limited TEX Real Estate Investment Trust  
Tower Property Fund Limited TWR Real Estate Investment Trust  
Redefine Properties Limited RDF Real Estate Investment Trust  
Intu Properties Plc ITU Real Estate Investment Trust  
Resilient REIT Limited RES Real Estate Investment Trust  
Fortress Income Fund Limited FFA Real Estate Investment Trust  
City Lodge Hotels Limited CLH Travel & Leisure 
Comair Limited COM Travel & Leisure 
Cullinan Holdings Limited CUL Travel & Leisure 
Famous Brands Limited FBR Travel & Leisure 
Gold Brands Investments Limited GBI Travel & Leisure 
Gooderson Leisure Corporation Ltd GDN Travel & Leisure 
Grand Parade Investments Limited GPL Travel & Leisure 
Phumelela Gaming & Leisure Limited PHM Travel & Leisure 
Spur Corporation Limited SUR Travel & Leisure 
Sun International Limited SUI Travel & Leisure 
Taste Holdings Limited TAS Travel & Leisure 
Tsogo Sun Holdings Limited TSH Travel & Leisure 
Value Group Limited VLE Travel & Leisure 
Wilderness Holdings Limited WIL Travel & Leisure 
Afrimat Limited AFT Construction & Materials 
Aveng Limited AEG Construction & Materials 
Basil Read Holdings Limited BIK Construction & Materials 
Consolidated Infrastructure Group Ltd CIL Construction & Materials 
Esor Limited ESR Construction & Materials 
Group Five Limited IPS Construction & Materials 
Mazor Group Limited MZR Construction & Materials 
Murray & Roberts Holdings Limited MUR Construction & Materials 
PPC Limited PKH Construction & Materials 
Raubex Group Limited RBX Construction & Materials 
Sephaku Holdings Limited SEP Construction & Materials 
Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd SSK Construction & Materials 
Trellidor Holdings Limited TRL Construction & Materials 
WG Wearne Limited WEA Construction & Materials 
Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Limited WBO Construction & Materials 
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Appendix A-2 Summary of Correlation & significance results 
Total Sample  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
SIZE positive  positive  positive (0.01) positive (0.01) 
TANG positive  positive  negative  negative  
PROF positive (0.01) positive (0.01) negative (0.01) negative (0.05) 
GROW positive  positive  positive (0.01) positive (0.05) 
CORD negative negative negative (0.05) negative  
TAX negative negative negative (0.01) negative 
     
REITs TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
SIZE negative negative positive  positive  
TANG positive  positive  positive (0.01) negative (0.01) 
PROF positive  positive  negative negative 
GROW negative negative positive  positive  
CORD positive  positive  negative negative 
TAX positive  positive  negative negative 
     
Travel & 
Leisure 
TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
SIZE positive  positive  positive  negative 
TANG negative negative  negative (0.05) negative 
PROF positive  positive  negative (0.01) negative (0.01) 
GROW positive  positive  positive  negative (0.05) 
CORD negative negative negative positive  
TAX negative negative negative (0.01) negative (0.01) 
     
Construction TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
SIZE positive  positive (0.01) negative (0.05) negative (0.05) 
TANG negative (0.05) negative (0.05) positive positive 
PROF negative  negative  negative (0.05) negative (0.01) 
GROW positive  positive  positive  negative 
CORD negative (0.05) negative  negative negative 
TAX negative  negative  negative negative (0.01) 
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Appendix A-3 Changes in Debt ratios across the period 1994 to 2016 for the Total 
Sample 
 
Total Sample 
Average  
(1994 to 1998) 
Average  
(2012 to 2016) 
Increase / 
Decrease 
TDBV 215.43% 686.23% 218.54% 
TDMV 22.66% 55.68% 145.69% 
TLBV 285.33% 755.09% 164.64% 
TLMV 71.36% 76.09% 6.63% 
 
 
In detail, the following changes can be seen; 
o Total Debt to Book Value of Equity (TDBV) increased from an average of 
215.43% (average total debt to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average 
of 686.23% (average total debt to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus 
increasing by 218.54% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Debt to Market Value of Equity (TDMV) increased from an average of 
22.66% (average total debt to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
55.68% (average total debt to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus increasing 
by 145.69% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity (TLBV) increased from an average of 
285.33% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 755.09% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 164.64% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity (TLMV) increased from an average of 
71.36% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 76.09% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 6.63% across the sample period.  
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Appendix A-4 – Total Sample – Graphical representation of the different leverage 
ratios for the period 1994 – 2016 
 
Figure 14: Total Debt to Book Value of Equity for the Total Sample 
 
 
Figure 15: Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity for the Total Sample 
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Figure 16: Total Debt to Market Value of Equity for the Total Sample 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity for the Total Sample 
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Appendix A-5 Changes in Debt ratios across the period 1994 to 2016 for the Real 
Estate and REIT Sector  
        
Real Estate & REITs 
Average  
(1994 to 1998) 
Average  
(2012 to 2016) 
Increase / 
Decrease 
TDBV 2826.55% 968.31% -65.74% 
TDMV 76.10% 65.69% -13.67% 
TLBV 2878.09% 1032.32% -64.13% 
TLMV 81.75% 74.93% -8.35% 
 
 
In detail, the following changes can be seen; 
o Total Debt to Book Value of Equity (TDBV) decreased from an average of 
2826.55% (average total debt to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average 
of 968.31% (average total debt to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus 
decreasing by 65.74% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Debt to Market Value of Equity (TDMV) decreased from an average of 
76.10% (average total debt to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
65.69% (average total debt to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus decreasing 
by 13.67% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity (TLBV) decreased from an average of 
2878.09% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 1032.32% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 2012 to 
2016), thus decreasing by 64.13% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity (TLMV) decreased from an average of 
81.75% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 74.93% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus decreasing by 8.35% across the sample period.  
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Appendix A-6 – Real Estate and REITs – Graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios for the period 1994 – 2016 
 
Figure 18: Total Debt to Book Value of Equity for the Real Estate Sector 
 
 
Figure 19: Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity for the Real Estate Sector 
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Figure 20: Total Debt to Market Value of Equity for the Real Estate Sector 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity for the Real Estate Sector 
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Appendix A-7 Changes in Debt ratios across the period 1994 to 2016 for the Travel 
and Leisure Sector  
        
Travel & Leisure 
Average  
(1994 to 1998) 
Average  
(2012 to 2016) 
Increase / 
Decrease 
TDBV 15.98% 137.48% 760.53% 
TDMV 14.23% 30.89% 117.03% 
TLBV 52.40% 232.68% 344.02% 
TLMV 44.01% 52.76% 19.86% 
 
 
In detail, the following changes can be seen; 
o Total Debt to Book Value of Equity (TDBV) increased from an average of 
15.98% (average total debt to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
137.48% (average total debt to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus increasing 
by 760.53% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Debt to Market Value of Equity (TDMV) increased from an average of 
14.23% (average total debt to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
30.89% (average total debt to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus increasing 
by 117.03% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity (TLBV) increased from an average of 
52.40% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 232.68% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 344.02% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity (TLMV) increased from an average of 
44.01% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 52.76% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 19.86% across the sample period.  
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Appendix A-8 – Travel & Leisure – Graphical representation of the different leverage 
ratios for the period 1994 – 2016 
 
Figure 22: Total Debt to Book Value of Equity for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
 
 
Figure 23: Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
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Figure 24: Total Debt to Market Value of Equity for the Travel and Leisure Sector 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity for the Travel and Leisure 
Sector 
 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
Total Debt to Market Value of Equity
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
140.00%
Total Liabilities to Market Value Equity
137 | P a g e  
 
Appendix A-9 Changes in Debt ratios across the period 1994 to 2016 for the 
Construction and Materials Sector  
        
Construction & 
Materials 
Average  
(1994 to 1998) 
Average  
(2012 to 2016) 
Increase / 
Decrease 
TDBV 26.91% 77.70% 188.70% 
TDMV 22.29% 33.94% 52.31% 
TLBV 119.29% 200.13% 67.77% 
TLMV 91.47% 133.40% 45.84% 
 
 
In detail, the following changes can be seen; 
o Total Debt to Book Value of Equity (TDBV) increased from an average of 
26.91% (average total debt to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
77.70% (average total debt to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus increasing 
by 188.70% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Debt to Market Value of Equity (TDMV) increased from an average of 
22.29% (average total debt to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an average of 
33.94% (average total debt to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), thus increasing 
by 52.31% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity (TLBV) increased from an average of 
119.29% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 200.13% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 67.77% across the sample period.  
 
o Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity (TLMV) increased from an average of 
91.47% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to an 
average of 133.40% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 2012 to 2016), 
thus increasing by 45.84% across the sample period.  
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Appendix A-10 – Construction & Materials – Graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios for the period 1994 – 2016 
Figure 26: Total Debt to Book Value of Equity for the Construction and Materials 
Sector  
 
 
Figure 27: Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity - Construction & Materials Sector 
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Figure 28: Total Debt to Market Value of Equity - Construction and Materials Sector 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Total Liabilities to Market Value of Equity - Construction & Materials 
Sector 
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Appendix A-11 Total Sample Result 
Total Sample 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV Firm Size Tangibility  Profitability  Growth  
Prime 
Rate 
Tax Rate 
ST Debt to 
Total Debt 
LT Debt to 
Total Debt 
CL to Total 
Liabilities 
NCL to TL 
1994 366.00% 426.51% 24.77% 68.36% 14.17 59.36% 13.94% 14.50 16.25% 35.00% 19.25% 80.75% 58.44% 41.56% 
1995 406.58% 481.13% 15.04% 46.35% 14.67 47.80% 15.25% 14.82 18.50% 35.00% 32.26% 67.74% 66.25% 33.75% 
1996 104.18% 175.64% 15.71% 55.40% 14.74 47.96% 12.56% 14.90 20.25% 35.00% 51.28% 47.74% 72.18% 27.82% 
1997 123.59% 197.82% 23.60% 72.65% 14.59 51.34% 11.15% 14.73 19.25% 35.00% 38.65% 60.21% 67.72% 32.28% 
1998 76.80% 145.56% 34.20% 114.06% 14.11 39.14% 13.54% 14.81 23.00% 30.00% 18.80% 69.60% 67.70% 32.30% 
1999 55.94% 162.95% 17.85% 71.99% 13.07 17.00% 3.10% 15.30 15.50% 30.00% 5.97% 89.62% 25.82% 74.18% 
2000 94.35% 136.82% 21.78% 56.34% 13.36 17.42% 7.08% 14.94 14.50% 30.00% 10.45% 85.67% 30.48% 69.52% 
2001 78.86% 120.37% 23.42% 53.40% 13.39 15.82% 6.66% 15.13 13.00% 30.00% 10.64% 86.30% 31.21% 68.79% 
2002 908.49% 1006.72% 29.38% 60.62% 13.55 19.27% 6.91% 15.21 17.00% 30.00% 13.83% 83.54% 30.87% 69.13% 
2003 716.27% 1365.23% 31.48% 62.77% 13.72 24.55% 8.90% 15.19 11.50% 30.00% 15.71% 83.76% 32.74% 67.26% 
2004 1082.12% 1231.57% 29.23% 48.41% 13.73 29.23% 12.69% 15.22 11.00% 30.00% 13.30% 83.79% 32.63% 67.37% 
2005 1602.06% 1838.04% 26.68% 46.00% 13.95 34.01% 19.64% 15.36 10.50% 29.00% 20.28% 79.18% 34.63% 65.37% 
2006 2059.07% 2391.53% 52.19% 73.71% 15.18 28.94% 17.12% 16.79 12.50% 29.00% 22.52% 77.38% 34.82% 65.18% 
2007 2981.70% 3181.13% 45.55% 64.41% 15.24 38.61% 16.80% 16.45 14.50% 29.00% 25.70% 73.73% 43.68% 56.32% 
2008 260.44% 367.30% 69.41% 100.57% 15.42 39.28% 7.97% 16.32 15.00% 28.00% 35.60% 62.65% 54.04% 45.96% 
2009 322.02% 406.99% 68.27% 103.26% 15.22 45.64% 9.87% 16.60 10.50% 28.00% 26.13% 72.82% 36.93% 63.07% 
2010 298.44% 373.39% 60.05% 94.13% 15.05 52.37% 13.00% 16.48 9.00% 28.00% 23.56% 76.18% 35.61% 64.39% 
2011 291.98% 354.97% 74.16% 105.59% 15.01 54.78% 8.33% 16.71 9.00% 28.00% 24.98% 74.96% 34.14% 65.86% 
2012 1018.60% 1123.66% 62.07% 90.03% 15.13 54.79% 10.56% 16.80 8.50% 28.00% 24.89% 74.84% 34.11% 65.89% 
2013 2174.28% 2330.84% 62.69% 86.01% 15.04 56.94% 11.13% 16.91 8.50% 28.00% 18.38% 81.32% 29.38% 70.62% 
2014 99.43% 133.61% 47.88% 66.72% 15.04 56.66% 10.73% 17.14 9.25% 28.00% 18.28% 81.68% 28.05% 71.95% 
2015 67.41% 89.13% 50.12% 65.98% 15.00 62.54% 9.69% 17.40 9.75% 28.00% 14.13% 83.89% 22.83% 77.17% 
2016 71.43% 98.23% 55.64% 71.73% 14.95 65.31% 6.60% 17.30 10.50% 28.00% 18.75% 79.81% 24.67% 75.33% 
                              
Average 663.48% 788.66% 40.92% 72.98% 1449.27% 41.69% 11.01% 1586.94% 13.36% 29.96% 21.88% 76.40% 40.39% 59.61% 
Min 55.94% 89.13% 15.04% 46.00% 1306.65% 15.82% 3.10% 1449.56% 8.50% 28.00% 5.97% 47.74% 22.83% 27.82% 
Max 2981.70% 3181.13% 74.16% 114.06% 1542.40% 65.31% 19.64% 1740.33% 23.00% 35.00% 51.28% 89.62% 72.18% 77.17% 
Std Dev 8.14 8.83 0.19 0.20 0.73 0.16 0.04 0.97 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.16 
Range 2925.76% 3091.99% 59.12% 68.06% 235.75% 49.49% 16.54% 290.77% 14.50% 7.00% 45.31% 41.88% 49.35% 49.35% 
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Appendix A-12 Real Estate Sector Results 
Real Estate & REITs 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV Firm Size Tangibility  Profitability  Growth  
Prime 
Rate 
Tax Rate 
ST Debt to 
Total Debt 
LT Debt to 
Total Debt 
CL to Total 
Liabilities 
NCL to TL 
1994 5284.00% 5369.61% 101.72% 106.64% 10.17 89.36% 7.35% 12.36 16.25% 35.00% 1.61% 98.39% 6.61% 93.39% 
1995 5165.94% 5231.11% 56.63% 59.44% 10.25 87.28% 7.65% 12.30 18.50% 35.00% 3.49% 96.51% 6.81% 93.19% 
1996 1675.45% 1715.19% 87.10% 93.45% 10.07 73.05% 9.37% 12.31 20.25% 35.00% 2.97% 77.67% 27.59% 72.41% 
1997 1653.30% 1699.67% 89.24% 96.25% 10.24 69.19% 9.68% 12.34 19.25% 35.00% 2.63% 78.08% 27.41% 72.59% 
1998 354.04% 374.85% 45.81% 52.97% 9.99 23.39% 4.05% 13.63 23.00% 30.00% 0.61% 27.40% 76.21% 23.79% 
1999 69.59% 194.24% 9.73% 33.81% 12.42 3.70% 1.37% 15.53 15.50% 30.00% 1.80% 91.79% 13.23% 86.77% 
2000 134.69% 159.76% 18.20% 22.28% 12.64 4.70% 6.14% 15.06 14.50% 30.00% 0.38% 93.50% 16.71% 83.29% 
2001 99.48% 117.04% 17.47% 22.87% 12.62 4.58% 5.64% 15.14 13.00% 30.00% 1.37% 94.04% 17.64% 82.36% 
2002 1354.95% 1458.44% 23.59% 29.50% 12.72 9.41% 4.74% 15.20 17.00% 30.00% 3.59% 92.43% 15.66% 84.34% 
2003 1160.58% 2178.97% 34.54% 48.67% 12.79 14.54% 4.55% 15.26 11.50% 30.00% 3.29% 96.36% 12.83% 87.17% 
2004 1737.86% 1935.84% 33.71% 40.01% 12.94 22.24% 8.12% 15.39 11.00% 30.00% 2.89% 93.24% 14.96% 85.04% 
2005 2764.37% 3118.93% 34.42% 42.99% 13.05 28.34% 13.77% 15.61 10.50% 29.00% 4.44% 95.25% 12.09% 87.91% 
2006 3363.38% 3845.58% 76.82% 90.17% 15.06 23.61% 12.98% 17.77 12.50% 29.00% 1.05% 98.78% 10.22% 89.78% 
2007 6293.11% 6606.63% 85.25% 99.01% 14.81 39.87% 7.15% 17.45 14.50% 29.00% 2.41% 97.45% 11.52% 88.48% 
2008 515.06% 559.64% 155.98% 174.53% 14.65 48.81% -10.41% 17.10 15.00% 28.00% 8.50% 91.35% 15.57% 84.43% 
2009 478.49% 519.51% 103.21% 116.63% 14.60 50.26% 3.07% 17.19 10.50% 28.00% 7.34% 92.53% 13.96% 86.04% 
2010 424.13% 468.47% 84.51% 101.46% 14.53 60.58% 11.09% 16.96 9.00% 28.00% 7.92% 91.96% 15.89% 84.11% 
2011 417.65% 454.87% 104.85% 121.43% 14.63 63.63% 6.35% 17.22 9.00% 28.00% 10.80% 89.10% 16.99% 83.01% 
2012 1522.76% 1630.77% 83.90% 98.49% 14.66 62.35% 9.18% 17.20 8.50% 28.00% 15.60% 84.31% 20.57% 79.43% 
2013 3106.26% 3292.17% 80.48% 90.49% 14.66 64.50% 10.01% 17.34 8.50% 28.00% 9.78% 90.15% 16.82% 83.18% 
2014 102.72% 113.68% 55.59% 63.03% 14.75 62.29% 10.08% 17.55 9.25% 28.00% 10.99% 88.95% 18.82% 81.18% 
2015 54.88% 62.19% 51.82% 58.62% 14.83 66.61% 8.91% 17.73 9.75% 28.00% 10.34% 89.15% 16.55% 83.45% 
2016 54.94% 62.77% 56.69% 64.01% 14.88 69.12% 5.74% 17.52 10.50% 28.00% 14.31% 84.06% 19.96% 80.04% 
                              
Average 1642.94% 1790.00% 64.84% 75.07% 1312.80% 45.28% 6.81% 1570.25% 13.36% 29.96% 5.57% 88.37% 18.46% 81.54% 
Min 54.88% 62.19% 9.73% 22.28% 999.01% 3.70% -10.41% 1229.55% 8.50% 28.00% 0.38% 27.40% 6.61% 23.79% 
Max 6293.11% 6606.63% 155.98% 174.53% 1506.00% 89.36% 13.77% 1777.02% 23.00% 35.00% 15.60% 98.78% 76.21% 93.39% 
Std Dev 18.56 19.29 0.36 0.38 1.84 0.28 0.05 1.93 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Range 6238.23% 6544.44% 146.24% 152.26% 506.99% 85.66% 24.17% 547.46% 14.50% 7.00% 15.21% 71.38% 69.60% 69.60% 
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Appendix A-13 Travel Sector Results  
Travel and Leisure 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV Firm Size Tangibility  Profitability  Growth  
Prime 
Rate 
Tax Rate 
ST Debt to 
Total Debt 
LT Debt to 
Total Debt 
CL to Total 
Liabilities 
NCL to TL 
1994 24.19% 62.22% 15.06% 35.67% 14.32 66.16% 14.37% 14.90 16.25% 35.00% 11.98% 88.02% 59.34% 40.66% 
1995 21.18% 64.71% 18.01% 48.27% 13.92 63.82% 15.50% 14.48 18.50% 35.00% 33.36% 66.64% 67.13% 32.87% 
1996 9.09% 45.25% 4.93% 30.21% 14.03 56.21% 12.16% 14.64 20.25% 35.00% 79.72% 20.28% 83.73% 16.27% 
1997 13.77% 50.51% 13.21% 45.62% 14.02 53.81% 10.94% 14.63 19.25% 35.00% 42.05% 57.95% 75.61% 24.39% 
1998 11.64% 39.33% 19.95% 60.30% 14.10 46.44% 18.35% 14.84 23.00% 30.00% 10.70% 89.30% 64.09% 35.91% 
1999 30.65% 76.19% 32.75% 88.77% 13.99 42.68% 6.62% 14.81 15.50% 30.00% 8.04% 91.96% 46.62% 53.38% 
2000 30.05% 72.36% 34.51% 78.09% 13.84 39.93% 10.95% 14.38 14.50% 30.00% 14.66% 85.34% 45.72% 54.28% 
2001 36.63% 72.15% 46.59% 86.56% 14.15 49.47% 6.86% 14.90 13.00% 30.00% 30.49% 69.51% 47.65% 52.35% 
2002 41.39% 73.76% 71.41% 115.02% 14.18 56.54% 8.24% 14.72 17.00% 30.00% 22.62% 77.38% 40.50% 59.50% 
2003 29.47% 65.12% 37.99% 72.89% 14.13 62.36% 14.43% 14.40 11.50% 30.00% 33.81% 63.29% 51.68% 48.32% 
2004 26.93% 68.25% 25.88% 49.87% 14.14 62.98% 20.86% 14.34 11.00% 30.00% 30.58% 65.34% 55.72% 44.28% 
2005 38.75% 77.85% 19.57% 36.16% 14.45 62.15% 25.80% 14.60 10.50% 29.00% 41.64% 55.95% 56.76% 43.24% 
2006 46.70% 85.06% 18.99% 34.19% 14.58 62.35% 21.70% 14.73 12.50% 29.00% 34.74% 65.26% 48.41% 51.59% 
2007 77.60% 120.21% 16.48% 26.08% 14.72 61.91% 20.46% 15.00 14.50% 29.00% 26.85% 69.93% 42.74% 57.26% 
2008 335.43% 451.49% 38.38% 55.73% 14.28 56.49% 20.40% 14.80 15.00% 28.00% 20.48% 65.80% 45.62% 54.38% 
2009 168.12% 229.23% 43.57% 62.81% 14.50 60.48% 18.38% 14.94 10.50% 28.00% 22.17% 69.50% 40.46% 59.54% 
2010 106.49% 156.20% 38.15% 58.12% 14.46 59.65% 16.33% 14.91 9.00% 28.00% 29.01% 69.37% 42.66% 57.34% 
2011 76.79% 125.26% 31.00% 51.53% 14.71 53.04% 13.18% 15.58 9.00% 28.00% 39.76% 60.24% 45.28% 54.72% 
2012 72.72% 120.15% 23.98% 40.41% 15.46 51.38% 17.89% 15.85 8.50% 28.00% 41.19% 57.56% 43.97% 56.03% 
2013 58.13% 107.43% 22.86% 40.19% 15.34 49.68% 17.98% 15.62 8.50% 28.00% 39.04% 59.31% 48.06% 51.94% 
2014 91.47% 163.90% 24.35% 44.29% 15.39 49.53% 17.02% 15.67 9.25% 28.00% 41.01% 58.99% 45.91% 54.09% 
2015 132.99% 196.29% 39.92% 59.70% 15.65 51.53% 15.35% 16.08 9.75% 28.00% 30.94% 57.13% 44.70% 55.30% 
2016 332.08% 575.64% 43.36% 79.20% 14.89 42.37% 17.81% 15.01 10.50% 28.00% 56.06% 43.94% 52.44% 47.56% 
                              
Average 78.79% 134.72% 29.60% 56.51% 1448.90% 54.83% 15.72% 1495.01% 13.36% 29.96% 32.21% 65.57% 51.95% 48.05% 
Min 9.09% 39.33% 4.93% 26.08% 1384.32% 39.93% 6.62% 1433.68% 8.50% 28.00% 8.04% 20.28% 40.46% 16.27% 
Max 335.43% 575.64% 71.41% 115.02% 1564.52% 66.16% 25.80% 1607.68% 23.00% 35.00% 79.72% 91.96% 83.73% 59.54% 
Std Dev 0.90 1.30 0.14 0.22 0.53 0.08 0.05 0.48 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.11 
Range 326.34% 536.32% 66.47% 88.94% 180.20% 26.23% 19.19% 174.00% 14.50% 7.00% 71.68% 71.68% 43.27% 43.27% 
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Appendix A-14 Construction Sector Results 
Construction & Materials 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV Firm Size Tangibility  Profitability  Growth  
Prime 
Rate 
Tax Rate 
ST Debt to 
Total Debt 
LT Debt to 
Total Debt 
CL to Total 
Liabilities 
NCL to TL 
1994 18.87% 97.80% 23.60% 94.90% 14.57 48.58% 14.44% 14.40 16.25% 35.00% 28.77% 71.23% 64.72% 35.28% 
1995 22.90% 107.29% 9.87% 44.45% 15.35 39.13% 15.97% 15.18 18.50% 35.00% 34.92% 65.08% 72.16% 27.84% 
1996 27.00% 119.07% 15.50% 65.25% 15.48 41.72% 13.02% 15.24 20.25% 35.00% 40.60% 59.40% 69.84% 30.16% 
1997 34.42% 129.86% 22.59% 83.85% 15.28 48.44% 11.40% 15.01 19.25% 35.00% 40.35% 59.65% 67.59% 32.41% 
1998 31.37% 142.43% 39.87% 168.89% 15.42 39.36% 13.40% 15.16 23.00% 30.00% 29.93% 70.07% 67.37% 32.63% 
1999 21.22% 110.04% 38.61% 218.81% 14.94 49.85% 7.21% 14.79 15.50% 30.00% 21.77% 78.23% 60.15% 39.85% 
2000 20.52% 113.92% 23.54% 140.92% 15.16 39.15% 7.17% 14.97 14.50% 30.00% 36.95% 63.05% 60.28% 39.72% 
2001 37.87% 158.72% 28.94% 131.03% 15.37 32.03% 9.81% 15.21 13.00% 30.00% 28.54% 71.46% 64.69% 35.31% 
2002 34.39% 144.51% 28.44% 123.97% 15.56 31.35% 12.32% 15.44 17.00% 30.00% 38.30% 61.70% 68.60% 31.40% 
2003 30.91% 126.92% 22.23% 89.21% 15.57 31.03% 16.10% 15.36 11.50% 30.00% 35.29% 64.71% 68.21% 31.79% 
2004 35.89% 122.95% 20.15% 67.83% 15.44 29.10% 19.58% 15.25 11.00% 30.00% 29.65% 70.35% 63.49% 36.51% 
2005 31.27% 127.66% 14.41% 57.73% 15.58 30.31% 28.54% 15.26 10.50% 29.00% 41.66% 58.34% 69.61% 30.39% 
2006 47.36% 177.38% 12.01% 54.68% 15.74 25.77% 24.33% 15.51 12.50% 29.00% 65.09% 34.91% 83.78% 16.22% 
2007 41.25% 163.54% 7.85% 37.09% 16.00 27.09% 27.41% 15.79 14.50% 29.00% 54.59% 45.41% 84.65% 15.35% 
2008 38.87% 192.99% 8.30% 52.99% 16.32 27.36% 19.48% 16.08 15.00% 28.00% 60.98% 39.02% 86.78% 13.22% 
2009 120.50% 285.45% 19.90% 95.55% 16.49 32.93% 17.99% 16.20 10.50% 28.00% 58.16% 41.84% 73.14% 26.86% 
2010 116.36% 264.81% 18.37% 93.57% 16.37 32.46% 15.60% 16.13 9.00% 28.00% 53.70% 46.30% 73.52% 26.48% 
2011 94.52% 241.09% 19.05% 100.49% 16.31 31.03% 10.37% 16.11 9.00% 28.00% 54.24% 45.76% 74.48% 25.52% 
2012 86.94% 235.33% 19.08% 106.02% 16.49 30.71% 8.66% 16.26 8.50% 28.00% 43.12% 56.88% 73.66% 26.34% 
2013 65.75% 195.84% 21.89% 110.98% 16.43 30.09% 9.43% 16.22 8.50% 28.00% 36.77% 63.23% 67.46% 32.54% 
2014 88.27% 220.43% 26.84% 112.60% 16.44 30.60% 7.92% 16.22 9.25% 28.00% 37.65% 62.35% 64.23% 35.77% 
2015 81.87% 177.43% 50.38% 150.23% 15.67 40.37% 7.89% 16.35 9.75% 28.00% 23.59% 76.41% 48.70% 51.30% 
2016 65.66% 171.64% 51.53% 187.16% 16.17 28.21% 8.75% 16.06 10.50% 28.00% 51.07% 48.93% 71.16% 28.84% 
                              
Average 51.91% 166.40% 23.61% 103.83% 1574.59% 34.64% 14.21% 1557.38% 13.36% 29.96% 41.12% 58.88% 69.49% 30.51% 
Min 18.87% 97.80% 7.85% 37.09% 1456.89% 25.77% 7.17% 1439.51% 8.50% 28.00% 21.77% 34.91% 48.70% 13.22% 
Max 120.50% 285.45% 51.53% 218.81% 1649.07% 49.85% 28.54% 1634.82% 23.00% 35.00% 65.09% 78.23% 86.78% 51.30% 
Std Dev 0.31 0.53 0.12 0.47 0.55 0.07 0.06 0.56 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 
Range 101.62% 187.65% 43.68% 181.72% 192.18% 24.08% 21.37% 195.31% 14.50% 7.00% 43.31% 43.31% 38.08% 38.08% 
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